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Abstract
Computability logic (CoL) is a recently introduced semantical platform and research program for
redeveloping logic as a formal theory of computability, as opposed to the formal theory of truth which
it has more traditionally been. Formulas in CoL stand for interactive computational problems, seen as
games between a machine and its environment; logical operators represent operations on such entities;
and “truth” is understood as existence of an effective solution, i.e., of an algorithmic winning strategy.
The formalism of CoL is open-ended, and may undergo series of extensions as the studies of the subject
advance. Propositional connectives and quantifiers in it come in a variety of indispensable versions. So
far three sorts of conjunction and disjunction — parallel, sequential and choice — have been studied,
with the first and the third sorts being reminiscent of the multiplicative and additive operators of linear
logic, respectively. The present paper adds one more natural kind to this collection, termed toggling.
The toggling operations can be characterized as lenient versions of choice operations where choices are
retractable, being allowed to be reconsidered any finite number of times. This way, they model trial-
and-error style decision steps in interactive computation. The main technical result of this paper is
constructing a sound and complete axiomatization for the propositional fragment of computability logic
whose vocabulary includes all four kinds of conjunction and disjunction: parallel, toggling, sequential
and choice, together with negation. Along with toggling conjunction and disjunction, the paper also
introduces the toggling versions of quantifiers and recurrence (“exponential”) operations.
MSC: primary: 03B47; secondary: 03F50; 03B70; 68Q10; 68T27; 68T30; 91A05
Keywords: Computability logic; Game semantics; Interactive computation; Constructive logics; Resource
logics
1 Introduction
Computability logic (CoL), introduced in [4, 9, 16], is a semantical, mathematical and philosophical platform,
and an ambitious program, for redeveloping logic as a formal theory of computability, as opposed to the
formal theory of truth which logic has more traditionally been.
Under the approach of CoL, formulas represent computational problems, and their “truth” is seen as
algorithmic solvability. In turn, computational problems — understood in their most general, interactive
sense — are defined as games played by a machine against its environment, with “algorithmic solvability”
meaning existence of a machine that wins the game against any possible behavior of the environment. And a
collection of the most basic and natural operations on interactive computational problems forms the logical
vocabulary of the theory. With this semantics, CoL provides a systematic answer to the fundamental question
“what can be computed?”, just as classical logic is a systematic tool for telling what is true. Furthermore,
as it turns out, in positive cases “what can be computed” always allows itself to be replaced by “how can be
computed”, which makes CoL of potential interest in not only theoretical computer science, but many more
applied areas as well, including interactive knowledge base systems, resource oriented systems for planning
and action, or declarative programming languages.
On the logical side, CoL promises to be an appealing, constructive and computationally meaningful
alternative to classical logic as a basis for applied theories. The first concrete steps towards realizing this
∗This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 0208816
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potential have been made very recently in [18, 19], where the CoL-based versionsCLA1 and CLA4 of Peano
arithmetic were elaborated. All theorems of the former express number-theoretic computational problems
with algorithmic solutions, and all theorems of the latter express number-theoretic computational problems
with polynomial time solutions. In either case, solutions can be effectively extracted from proofs, which
reduces problem-solving to theorem-proving. Furthermore, CLA4 has also been shown to be complete in
the sense that every number-theoretic computational problem with a polynomial time solution is represented
by some theorem of the system.
The formalism of CoL is open-ended, and is expected to undergo series of extensions as the studies of the
subject advance. Correspondingly, among the main goals of CoL at the present early stage of development
still remains identifying the most natural and potentially interesting operations on computational problems,
and finding axiomatizations for the corresponding sets of valid formulas. Considerable advances have already
been made in this direction ([5]-[8],[10]-[15],[17]-[18],[21]), and the present paper tells one more success story.
The main operations studied so far are:
• Negation: ¬.
• Constant elementary games (0-ary operations):
– ⊤ (automatically won game) and ⊥ (automatically lost game).
• Parallel operations:
– ∧ (parallel conjunction) and ∨ (parallel disjunction);
– ∧ (parallel universal quantifier) and ∨ (parallel existential quantifier);
– ∧| (parallel recurrence) and ∨| (parallel corecurrence).
• Choice operations:
– ⊓ (choice conjunction) and ⊔ (choice disjunction);
– ⊓ (choice universal quantifier) and ⊔ (choice existential quantifier).
• Sequential operations:
– △ (sequential conjunction) and ▽ (sequential disjunction);
– △ (sequential universal quantifier) and ▽ (sequential existential quantifier);
– −∧
| (sequential recurrence) and
−∨
| (sequential corecurrence).
• Blind operations:
– ∀ (blind universal quantifier) and ∃ (blind existential quantifier).
• Branching operations:
– ◦
| (branching recurrence) and ◦| (branching corecurrence).
The branching operations have a number of natural sharpenings, among which are the finite and the
countable versions of branching recurrence and corecurrence.
There are also various reduction operations: →, defined by A → B = ¬A ∨ B; >– , defined by A >–B =
∧
|A→ B; ◦– , defined by A ◦–B = ◦|A→ B; |>– , defined by A |>–B = −∧|A→ B; etc.
The present paper introduces the following new group:
• Toggling operations:
– ∧ (toggling conjunction) and ∨ (toggling disjunction);
– ∧ (toggling universal quantifier) and ∨ (toggling existential quantifier);
– ∧| (toggling recurrence) and ∨| (toggling corecurrence);
– ◦| (toggling-branching recurrence) and ◦| (toggling-branching corecurrence).
This group also induces the reduction operations >– and ◦– , defined by A >–B = ∧|A → B and A ◦–B =
◦|A→ B.
The main technical result of this paper is constructing a sound and complete axiomatization for the
propositional fragment of CoL whose logical vocabulary consists of ¬, ⊤, ⊥, ∧, ∨, ∧, ∨, △, ▽, ⊓, ⊔.
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2 A quick tour of the operation zoo of computability logic
In this section we give a very brief and informal overview of the language of computability logic and the
game-semantical meanings of its main operators for those unfamiliar with the subject. In what follows, ⊤
and ⊥ are symbolic names for the players to which we earlier referred as the machine and the environment,
respectively.
First of all, it should be noted that computability logic is a conservative extension of classical logic.
Classical propositions — as well as predicates as generalized propositions — are viewed as special, elementary
sorts of games that have no moves and are automatically won by the machine if true, and lost if false. The
languages of various reasonably expressive fragments of computability logic would typically include two sorts
of atoms: elementary atoms p, q, r(x), s(x, y), . . . to represent elementary games, and general atoms P ,
Q, R(x), S(x, y), . . . to represent any, not-necessarily-elementary, games. The classically-shaped operators
¬,∧,∨,→,∀ ,∃ are conservative generalizations of the corresponding classical operations from elementary
games to all games. This means that, when applied to elementary games, they again produce elementary
games, and their meanings happen to coincide with the classical meanings.
2.1 Constant elementary games
These are two 0-ary “operations”, for which we use the same symbols ⊤ and ⊥ as for the two players. ⊤ is
an elementary game automatically won by ⊤, and ⊥ is an elementary game won by ⊥. Just as classical logic,
computability logic sees no difference between two true or two false propositions, so that we have “Snow is
white”=“0=0”=⊤ and “Snow is black”=“0=1”=⊥.
2.2 Negation
Negation ¬ is a role-switch operation: ¬A is obtained from A by turning ⊤’s (legal) moves and wins into
⊥’s (legal) moves and wins, and vice versa. For example, if Chess means the game of chess from the point
of view of the white player, then ¬Chess is the same game from the point of view of the black player.1 And
where 0=0 is an elementary game automatically won by ⊤, ¬0=0 is an elementary game automatically won
by ⊥— there are no moves to interchange here, so only the winners are interchanged. From this explanation
it must be clear that ¬, when applied to elementary games (propositions or predicates), indeed acts like
classical negation, as promised.
2.3 Choice operations
The choice operations model decision steps in the course of interaction, with disjunction and existential
quantifier meaning ⊤’s choices, and conjunction and universal quantifier meaning choices by ⊥. For instance,
where f(x) is a function, ⊓x⊔y
(
y=f(x)
)
is a game in which the first move/choice is by the environment,
consisting in specifying a particular value m for x. Such a move, which intuitively can be seen as asking the
question “what is the value of f(m)?” brings the game down to the position⊔y
(
y=f(m)
)
. The next step is
by the machine, which should specify a value n for y, further bringing the game down to the elementary game
n=f(m), won by the machine if true and lost if false. ⊤’s move n can thus be seen as answering/claiming
that n is the value of f(m). From this explanation it must be clear that ⊓x⊔y
(
y=f(x)
)
represents the
problem of computing f , with ⊤ having an algorithmic winning strategy for this game iff f is a computable
function. Similarly, where p(x) is a predicate, ⊓x
(
¬p(x) ⊔ p(x)
)
represents the problem of deciding p(x):
here, again, the first move is by the environment, consisting in choosing a value m for x (asking whether
p(m) is true); and the next step is by the machine which, in order to win, should choose the true disjunct of
¬p(m) ⊔ p(m), i.e. correctly answer the question. Formally, A ⊔B can be defined as ¬(¬A ⊓ ¬B), or A ⊓B
can be defined as ¬(¬A⊔¬B); furthermore, assuming that the universe of discourse is {1, 2, 3, . . .}, ⊓xA(x)
can be defined as A(1) ⊓A(2) ⊓A(3) ⊓ . . . and ⊔xA(x) as A(1)⊔A(2)⊔A(3)⊔ . . .. It should be mentioned
that making an initial choice of a component by the corresponding player in a choice combination of games
is not only that player’s privilege, but also an obligation: the player will be considered to lose the game if it
fails to make a choice.
1Here and later, we consider a version of chess with no draw outcomes — for instance, the one where draw is declared to be
a win for the black player — so that each play is won by one of the players and lost by the other player.
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2.4 Parallel operations
The parallel operations combine games in a way that corresponds to the intuition of concurrent computations.
Playing A ∧B or A ∨ B means playing, in parallel, the two games A and B. In A ∧B, ⊤ is considered the
winner if it wins in both of the components, while in A ∨B it is sufficient to win in one of the components.
Then the parallel quantifiers and recurrences are defined by:
∧xA(x) = A(1) ∧ A(2) ∧ A(3) ∧ . . .
∨xA(x) = A(1) ∨ A(2) ∨ A(3) ∨ . . .
∧
|A = A ∧ A ∧ A ∧ . . .
∨
|A = A ∨ A ∨ A ∨ . . .
To appreciate the difference between choice operations and their parallel counterparts, let us compare the
games Chess ∨¬Chess and Chess⊔¬Chess. The former is, in fact, a simultaneous play on two boards, where
on the left board ⊤ plays white, and on the right board ⊤ plays black. There is a simple strategy for ⊤ that
guarantees success against any adversary. All that ⊤ needs to do is to mimic, in Chess, the moves made by
⊥ in ¬Chess, and vice versa. On the other hand, winning the game Chess ⊔¬Chess is not easy: here, at the
very beginning, ⊤ has to choose between Chess and ¬Chess, and then win the chosen one-board game.
While all classical tautologies automatically hold when the classically-shaped operators are applied to
elementary games, in the general (nonelementary) case the class of valid principles shrinks. For example,
¬P ∨ (P ∧ P ) is no longer valid. The above “mimicking strategy” would obviously fail in the three-board
game
¬Chess ∨ (Chess ∧Chess),
for here the best that ⊤ can do is to pair ¬Chess with one of the two conjuncts of Chess ∧ Chess. It is
possible that then ¬Chess and the unmatched Chess are both lost, in which case the whole game will be lost.
As much as this example may remind us of linear logic, it should be noted that the class of principles with
parallel connectives validated by computability logic is not the same as the class of multiplicative formulas
provable in linear or affine logic. An example separating CoL from both linear and affine logics is Blass’s [2]
principle (
(¬P ∨ ¬Q) ∧ (¬R ∨ ¬S)
)
∨
(
(P ∨R) ∧ (Q ∨ S)
)
,
not provable in affine logic but valid in CoL. The same applies to principles containing choice (“additive”)
and recurrence (“exponential”) operators.
2.5 Reduction
The operation →, defined in the standard way by A → B = ¬A ∨ B, is perhaps most interesting from the
computability-theoretic point of view. Intuitively, A → B is the problem of reducing B to A. Putting it
in other words, solving A → B means solving B while having A as an (external, environment-provided)
computational resource. “Computational resource” is symmetric to “computational problem”: what is a
problem (task) for the machine, is a resource for the environment, and vice versa. To get a feel for → as
a problem reduction operator, let us look at reducing the acceptance problem to the halting problem. The
halting problem can be expressed by
⊓x⊓y
(
Halts(x, y) ⊔ ¬Halts(x, y)
)
,
where Halts(x, y) is the predicate “Turing machine (encoded by) x halts on input y”. And the acceptance
problem can be expressed by
⊓x⊓y
(
Accepts(x, y) ⊔ ¬Accepts(x, y)
)
,
with Accepts(x, y) meaning “Turing machine x accepts input y”. While the acceptance problem is not
decidable, it is algorithmically reducible to the halting problem. In particular, there is a machine that
always wins the game
⊓x⊓y
(
Halts(x, y) ⊔ ¬Halts(x, y)
)
→ ⊓x⊓y
(
Accepts(x, y) ⊔ ¬Accepts(x, y)
)
.
A strategy for solving this problem is to wait till the environment specifies values m and n for x and y in the
consequent, thus asking the question “does machine m accept input n?”. In response, ⊤ selects the same
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values m and n for x and y in the antecedent (where the roles of ⊤ and ⊥ are switched), thus asking the
counterquestion “does m halt on n?”. The environment will have to correctly answer this counterquestion,
or else it loses. If it answers “No”, then ⊤ also says “No” in the consequent, i.e., selects the right disjunct
there, as not halting implies not accepting. Otherwise, if the environment’s response in the antecedent is
“Yes”, ⊤ simulates machine m on input n until it halts and then selects, in the consequent, the left or the
right disjunct depending on whether the simulation accepted or rejected.
2.6 Blind operations
The blind group of operations comprises ∀ and its dual ∃ (∃x = ¬∀x¬). The meaning of ∀xA(x) is similar
to that of ⊓xA(x), with the difference that the particular value of x that the environment “selects” is
invisible to the machine (more precisely, there is no move signifying such a “selection”), so that it has to
play blindly in a way that guarantees success no matter what that value is. This way, ∀ and ∃ produce
games with imperfect information.
Compare the problems
⊓x
(
Even(x) ⊔Odd(x)
)
and
∀x
(
Even(x) ⊔Odd(x)
)
.
Both of them are about telling whether an arbitrary given number is even or odd; the difference is only in
whether that “given number” is communicated to the machine or not. The first problem is an easy-to-win,
two-move-deep game of a structure that we have already seen. The second game, on the other hand, is
one-move deep with only the machine to make a move — select the “true” disjunct, which is hardly possible
to do as the value of x remains unspecified.
As an example of a solvable nonelementary ∀-problem, let us look at
∀x
(
Even(x) ⊔Odd(x) → ⊓y
(
Even(x+y) ⊔Odd(x+y)
))
,
solving which means solving what follows “∀x” without knowing the value of x. Unlike ∀x
(
Even(x) ⊔
Odd(x)
)
, this game is certainly winnable: The machine waits till the environment selects a value n for y in
the consequent and also selects one of the ⊔-disjuncts in the antecedent (if either selection is never made, the
machine automatically wins). Then: If n is even, in the consequent the machine makes the same selection left
or right as the environment made in the antecedent, and otherwise, if n is odd, it reverses the environment’s
selection.
2.7 Sequential operations
One of the ways to characterize the sequential conjunction A△B is to say that this is a game that starts
and proceeds as a play of A; it will also end as an ordinary play of A unless, at some point, ⊥ decides
— by making a special switch move — to abandon A and switch to B. In such a case the play restarts,
continues and ends as an ordinary play of B without the possibility to go back to A. A▽B is the same,
only here it is ⊤ who decides whether and when to switch from A to B. These generalize to the infinite cases
A0 △A1 △A2 △ . . . and A0 ▽A1 ▽A2 ▽ . . .: here the corresponding player can make any finite number n
of switches, in which case the winner in the play will be the player who wins in An; and if an infinite number
of switches are made, then the player responsible for this is considered the loser. The sequential quantifiers,
as we may guess, are defined by
△xA(x) = A(1)△A(2)△A(3)△ . . .
and
▽xA(x) = A(1)▽A(2)▽A(3)▽ . . . ,
and the sequential recurrence and corecurrence are defined by
−∧
|A = A△A△A△ . . .
and
−∨
|A = A▽A▽A▽ . . . .
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Below are a couple of examples providing insights into the computational intuitions associated with the
sequential operations. See [15] for more.
Let p(x) be any predicate. Then the game ⊓x
(
¬p(x)▽ p(x)
)
represents the problem of semideciding
p(x): it is not hard to see that this game has an effective winning strategy by ⊤ iff p(x) is semidecidable
(recursively enumerable). Indeed, if p(x) is semidecidable, a winning strategy is to wait until ⊥ selects
a particular m for x, thus bringing the game down to ¬p(m)▽ p(m). After that, ⊤ starts looking for a
certificate of p(m)’s being true. If and when such a certificate is found (meaning that p(m) is indeed true),
⊤ makes a switch move turning ¬p(m)▽ p(m) into the true and hence ⊤-won p(m); and if no certificate
exists (meaning that p(m) is false), then ⊤ keeps looking for a non-existent certificate forever and thus
never makes any moves, meaning that the game ends as ¬p(m), which, again, is a true and hence ⊤-won
elementary game. And vice versa: any effective winning strategy for ⊓x
(
¬p(x)▽ p(x)
)
can obviously be
seen as a semidecision procedure for p(x), which accepts an input m iff the strategy ever makes a switch
move in the scenario where ⊥’s initial choice of a value for x is m.
Algorithmic solvability (computability) of games has been shown to be closed under modus ponens and
a number of other familiar or expected rules, such as “from A and B conclude A ∧ B”, “from A conclude
⊓xA”, “from A conclude ∧|A”, etc. In view of these closures, the validity (= “always computability”) of
the principles discussed below implies certain known facts from the theory of computation. Needless to say,
those examples demonstrate how CoL can be used as a systematic tool for defining new interesting properties
and relations between computational problems, and not only reproducing already known theorems but also
discovering an infinite variety of new facts.
The following formula, which can be shown to be valid with respect to our semantics, implies — in a
sense, “expresses” — the well known fact that, if both a predicate p(x) and its negation ¬p(x) are recursively
enumerable (i.e., p(x) is both semidecidable and co-semidecidable), then p(x) is decidable:
⊓x
(
¬p(x)▽ p(x)
)
∧⊓x
(
p(x)▽¬p(x)
)
→⊓x
(
¬p(x) ⊔ p(x)
)
. (1)
Actually, the validity of (1) means something more than just noted: it means that the problem of deciding
p(x) is reducible to (the ∧-conjunction of) the problems of semideciding p(x) and ¬p(x). In fact, a reducibility
in an even stronger sense (in a sense that has no name) holds, expressed by the following valid formula:
⊓x
((
¬p(x)▽ p(x)
)
∧
(
(p(x)▽ ¬p(x)
)
→
(
¬p(x) ⊔ p(x)
))
. (2)
Computability logic defines computability of a game A(x) as computability of its⊓ -closure, so the prefix
⊓x can be safely removed in the above formula and, after writing simply “p” instead of “p(x)”, the validity
of (2) means the same as the validity of the following propositional-level formula, provable in our sound and
complete propositional system CL13:
(¬p▽ p) ∧ (p▽ ¬p)→ ¬p ⊔ p. (3)
Furthermore, the above principle is valid not only for predicates (elementary games), but also for all
games that we consider, as evidenced by the provability of the following formula in (the sound) CL13:
(¬P ▽ P ) ∧ (P ▽ ¬P )→ ¬P ⊔ P. (4)
Similarly, formula (1) remains valid with P (x) instead of p(x):
⊓x
(
¬P (x)▽P (x)
)
∧⊓x
(
P (x)▽¬P (x)
)
→⊓x
(
¬P (x) ⊔ P (x)
)
. (5)
For our next example, remember the relation of mapping reducibility (more often called many-one re-
ducibility) of a predicate q(x) to a predicate p(x), defined as existence of an effective function f such that,
for any n, q
(
n
)
is equivalent to p
(
f(n)
)
. It is not hard to see that this relation holds if and only if the game
⊓x⊔y
((
q(x)→ p(y)
)
∧
(
p(y)→ q(x)
))
,
which we abbreviate as ⊓x⊔y
(
q(x) ↔ p(y)
)
, has an algorithmic winning strategy by ⊤. In this sense,
⊓x⊔y
(
q(x)↔ p(y)
)
expresses the problem of mapping reducing q to p. Then the validity of the following
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formula implies the known fact that, if q is mapping reducible to p and p is recursively enumerable, then so
is q:2
⊓x⊔y
(
q(x)↔ p(y)
)
∧⊓x
(
¬p(x)▽ p(x)
)
→⊓x
(
¬q(x)▽ q(x)
)
. (6)
As in the earlier examples, the validity of (6), in fact, means something even more: it means that the
problem of semideciding q is reducible to the (∧-conjunction of the) problems of mapping reducing q to p
and semideciding p.
2.8 Branching operations
The branching operations come in the form of branching recurrence ◦
| and its dual branching corecurrence
◦
| , which can be defined by ◦|A = ¬◦
| ¬A. We have already seen two other — parallel and sequential — sorts
of recurrences, and it might be a good idea to explain ◦
| by comparing it with them.
What is common to all members of the family of (co)recurrence operations is that, when applied to
A, they turn it into a game playing which means repeatedly playing A. In terms of resources, recurrence
operations generate multiple “copies” of A, thus making A a reusable/recyclable resource. The difference
between the various sorts of recurrences is how “reusage” is exactly understood.
Imagine a computer that has a program successfully playing Chess. The resource that such a computer
provides is obviously something stronger than just Chess, for it permits to play Chess as many times as
the user wishes, while Chess, as such, only assumes one play. Even the simplest operating system would
allow to start a session of Chess, then — after finishing or abandoning and destroying it — start a new play
again, and so on. The game that such a system plays — i.e. the resource that it supports/provides — is the
already known to us sequential recurrence −∧
|Chess, which assumes an unbounded number of plays of Chess
in a sequential fashion. A more advanced operating system, however, would not require to destroy the old
sessions before starting new ones; rather, it would allow to run as many parallel sessions as the user needs.
This is what is captured by the parallel recurrence ∧|Chess. As a resource, ∧| Chess is obviously stronger
than −∧
|Chess as it gives the user more flexibility. But ∧| is still not the strongest form of reusage. A really
good operating system would not only allow the user to start new sessions of Chess without destroying old
ones; it would also make it possible to branch/replicate each particular stage of each particular session, i.e.
create any number of “copies” of any already reached position of the multiple parallel plays of Chess, thus
giving the user the possibility to try different continuations from the same position. What corresponds to
this intuition is the branching recurrence ◦
| Chess.
So, the user of the resource ◦
|A does not have to restart A from the very beginning every time it wants to
reuse it; rather, it is (essentially) allowed to backtrack to any of the previous — not necessarily starting —
positions and try a new continuation from there, thus depriving the adversary of the possibility to reconsider
the moves it has already made in that position. This is in fact the type of reusage every purely software
resource allows or would allow in the presence of an advanced operating system and unlimited memory:
one can start running process A; then fork it at any stage thus creating two threads that have a common
past but possibly diverging futures (with the possibility to treat one of the threads as a “backup copy”
and preserve it for backtracking purposes); then further fork any of the branches at any time; and so on.
The less flexible type of reusage of A assumed by ∧|A, on the other hand, is closer to what infinitely many
autonomous physical resources would naturally offer, such as an unlimited number of independently acting
robots each performing task A, or an unlimited number of computers with limited memories, each one only
capable of and responsible for running a single thread of process A. Here the effect of replicating/forking
an advanced stage of A cannot be achieved unless, by good luck, there are two identical copies of the stage,
meaning that the corresponding two robots or computers have so far acted in precisely the same ways. As
for −∧
|A, it models the task performed by a single reusable physical resource — the resource that can perform
task A over and over again any number of times.
The operation ◦
| also has a series of weaker versions obtained by imposing various restrictions on the
quantity and form of reusages. Among the interesting and natural weakenings of ◦
| is the countable branching
recurrence ◦
| ℵ0 in the style of Blass’s [1, 2] repetition operation R. See [17] for a discussion of such operations.
Branching recurrence ◦
| stands out as the strongest of all recurrence operations, allowing to reuse A
(in ◦
|A) in the strongest algorithmic sense possible. This makes the associated reduction operation ◦– ,
2By the way, the same principle does not hold with “Turing reducible” instead of “mapping reducible”.
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defined by A ◦–B = ◦|A → B, the weakest and hence most general form of algorithmic reduction. The
well known concept of Turing reduction has the same claims. The latter, however, is only defined for the
traditional, non-interactive sorts of computational problems — two-step, input-output, question-answer sorts
of problems that in our terms are written as ⊓x
(
p(x) ⊔ ¬p(x)
)
(the problem of deciding predicate p) or
⊓x⊔y
(
y=f(x)
)
(the problem of computing function f). And it is no surprise that our ◦– , when restricted
to such problems, turns out to be equivalent to Turing reduction. Furthermore, when A and B are traditional
sorts of problems, A ◦–B further turns out to be equivalent to A >–B (but not to A |>–B), as the differences
between A >–B and A ◦–B, while substantial in the general (truly interactive) case, turn out to be too
subtle to be relevant when A is a game that models only a very short and simple potential dialogue between
the interacting parties, consisting in just asking a question and giving an answer. The benefits from the
greater degree of resource-reusage flexibility offered by A ◦–B (as opposed to A >–B) are related to the
possibility for the machine to try different reactions to the same action(s) by the environment in A. But
such potential benefits cannot be realized when A is, say, ⊓x
(
p(x)⊔¬p(x)
)
, because here a given individual
session of A immediately ends with an environment’s move, to which the machine simply has no legal or
meaningful responses at all, let alone having multiple possible responses to experiment with.
Thus, both ◦– and >– are conservative extensions of Turing reduction from traditional sorts of problems
to problems of arbitrary degrees and forms of interactivity. Of these two operations, however, only ◦– has
the moral right to be called a legitimate successor of Turing reducibility, in the sense that, just like Turing
reducibility (in its limited context), ◦– rather than >– is an ultimate formal counterpart of our most general
intuition of algorithmic reduction. And perhaps it is no accident that, as shown in [10, 13, 21], its logical
behavior — along with the choice operations — is precisely captured by Heyting’s intuitionistic calculus.
As an aside, this means that CoL offers a good justification — in the form of a mathematically strict and
intuitively convincing semantics — of the constructivistic claims of intuitionistic logic, and a materialization
of Kolmogorov’s [20] well known yet so far rather abstract thesis, according to which intuitionistic logic is a
logic of problems.
Our recurrence operations, in their logical spirit, are reminiscent of the exponential operators of linear
logic. It should be noted that, as shown in [16], linear — in fact, affine — logic is sound but incomplete
when its additives are read as our choice operators, multiplicatives as parallel operators, and exponentials
as either parallel or branching recurrences. Here the sequential sort of recurrences stands out in that linear
logic becomes simply unsound if its exponentials !, ? are interpreted as our −∧
| ,
−∨
| . The same applies to the
toggling sorts ∧| , ∨| , ◦| , ◦| of recurrences that will be introduced shortly.
Remember the concept of the Kolmogorov complexity k(x) of a number x, which can be defined as
the size (logarithm) |m| of the smallest Turing machine (encoded by) m that returns x on input 1. Just
like the acceptance problem ⊓x⊓y
(
Accepts(x, y) ⊔ ¬Accepts(x, y)
)
, the Kolmogorov complexity problem
⊓x⊔y
(
y=k(x)
)
is known to be algorithmically reducible — specifically, Turing reducible — to the halting
problem. Unlike the former case, however, the reduction in the latter case essentially requires repeated usage
of the halting problem as a resource. Namely, the reducibility holds only in the sense of ◦– , >– or even |>–
but not in the sense of→. As an exercise, the reader may try to come up with an informal description of an
algorithmic winning strategy for any one of the following games:
⊓x⊓y
(
Halts(x, y) ⊔ ¬Halts(x, y)
)
◦–⊓x⊔y
(
y=k(x)
)
;
⊓x⊓y
(
Halts(x, y) ⊔ ¬Halts(x, y)
)
>–⊓x⊔y
(
y=k(x)
)
;
⊓x⊓y
(
Halts(x, y) ⊔ ¬Halts(x, y)
)
|>–⊓x⊔y
(
y=k(x)
)
.
2.9 Toggling operations
The new, toggling group of operations forms another natural phylum in this zoo of game operations.
One of the intuitive ways to characterize the toggling disjunction A ∨B is the following. This game starts
and proceeds as a play of A. It will also end as an ordinary play of A unless, at some point, ⊤ decides to
switch to B, after which the game becomes and continues as B. It will also end as B unless, at some point,
⊤ decides to switch back to A. In such a case the game again becomes A, where A resumes from the position
in which it was abandoned (rather than from its start position, as would be the case, say, in A▽B ▽A).
Later ⊤ may again switch to (the abandoned position of) B, and so on. ⊤ wins the overall play iff it switches
from one component to another (“changes its mind”, or “corrects its mistake”) at most finitely many times
and wins in its final (and hence “real”) choice, i.e., in the component which was chosen last to switch to.
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An alternative way to characterize A ∨B is to say that it is played exactly as A ∨ B, with the only
difference that ⊤ is expected to make a “choose A” or “choose B” move some finite number of times. If
infinitely many choices are made, ⊤ loses. Otherwise, the winner in the play will be the player who wins in
the component that was chosen last (“the eventual choice”). The case of ⊤ having made no choices at all is
treated as if it had chosen A (thus, as in sequential disjunction, the leftmost component is the “default”, or
“automatically made”, initial choice).
It is important to note that the adversary never knows whether a given choice of a component of A ∨B is
the last choice or not (and perhaps ⊤ itself does not know that either, every time it makes a choice honestly
believing that the present choice is going to be final). Otherwise, if ⊤ was required to indicate that it has
made its final choice, then the resulting operation would simply be the same as — more precisely, equivalent
to — A⊔B. Indeed, in the kind of games that we deal with (called static games), it never hurts a player to
postpone making moves, so the adversary could just inactively wait till the last choice is declared, and start
playing the chosen component only after that, as in the case of A ⊔ B; under these circumstances, making
some temporary choices before making the final choice would not make any sense for ⊤, either.
What would happen if we did not require that ⊤ can change its mind only finitely meany times? There
would be no “final choice” in this case. So, the only natural winning condition in the case of infinitely many
choices would be to say that ⊤ wins iff it simply wins in one of the components. But then the resulting
operation would be the same as — more precisely, equivalent to — our kind old friend ∨, as a smart ⊤ would
always opt for keeping switching between components forever. That is, allowing infinitely many choices
would amount to not requiring any choices at all, as is the case with A ∨B.
One may also ask what would happen if we allowed ⊤ to make an arbitrary initial choice between A and
B and then reconsider its choice only (at most) once? (“n times” instead of “once” for any particular n > 1
would not be natural or necessary to consider). Such an operation on games, albeit reasonable, would not
be basic. That is because it can be expressed through our primitives as (A▽B) ⊔ (B ▽A).
Thus, we have four basic and natural sorts A∨B, A ∨B, A▽B, A⊔B of disjunctions, and denying any
of these full citizenship would make computability logic unsettlingly incomplete. What is common between
these four operations and what warrants the shared qualification “disjunction” is that each one is a “win
one out of two” kind of a combination of games from ⊤’s perspective. A∨B is the weakest (easiest for ⊤ to
win) kind of a disjunction, as it does not require any choices at all. Next comes A ∨B, which does require
a choice but in the weakest sense possible. A ⊔ B is the hardest-to-win disjunction, requiring a choice in
the strongest sense. A▽B is the next-hardest disjunction. It replaces the strict choice of A ⊔ B by the
next-strictest kind known in the traditional theory of computation as semidecision.
Does the (very) weak sort of choice captured by ∨ have a meaningful non-mathematical, everyday-life
counterpart? Obviously it does. This is the kind of choice that one would ordinarily call (making a correct)
choice after trial and error. So, an alternative, sexier name for our toggling operations could perhaps be
“trial-and-error operations”. Indeed, a problem is generally considered to be solved after trial and error
(a correct choice/solution/answer found) if, after perhaps coming up with several wrong solutions, a true
solution is eventually found. That is, mistakes are tolerated and forgotten as long as they are eventually
corrected. It is however necessary that new solutions stop coming at some point, so that there is a last
solution whose correctness determines the success of the effort. Otherwise, if answers have kept changing all
the time, no answer has really been given after all. Or, imagine Bob has been married and divorced several
times. Every time he said “I do”, he probably honestly believed that this time, at last, his bride was “the
one”, with whom he would live happily ever after. Bob will be considered to have found his Ms. Right after
all if and only if one of his marriages indeed turns out to be happy and final.
Back from our detour to the layman’s world, as we already know, for a predicate p(x), ⊓x
(
¬p(x)⊔p(x)
)
expresses the problem of deciding p(x), and⊓x
(
¬p(x)▽ p(x)
)
expresses the weaker problem of semideciding
p(x). What is then expressed by ⊓x
(
¬p(x) ∨ p(x)
)
? This is also a decision-style problem, but still weaker
than the problem of semideciding p(x). This problem has been studied in the literature under several names,
most common of which probably is recursively approximating p(x) (cf. [3], Definition 8.3.9). It means
telling whether p(x) is true or not, but doing so in the same style as semideciding does in negative cases: by
correctly saying “Yes” or “No” at some point (after perhaps taking back previous answers several times) and
never reconsidering this answer afterwards. Observe that semideciding p(x) can be seen as always saying
“No” at the beginning and then, if this answer is incorrect, changing it to “Yes” at some later time; so, when
the answer is negative, this will be expressed by saying “No” and never taking back this answer, yet without
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ever indicating that the answer is final and will not change.3 Thus, the difference between semideciding and
recursively approximating is that, unlike a semidecision procedure, a recursive approximation procedure can
reconsider both negative and positive answers, and do so several times rather than only once.
According to Sho¨nfield’s Limit Lemma,4 a predicate p(x) is recursively approximable (i.e., the problem
of its recursive approximation has an algorithmic solution) iff p(x) is of Turing degree ≤∅′, that is, p(x)
is Turing reducible to the halting problem. It is known that this, in turn, means nothing but having the
arithmetical complexity ∆2, i.e., that both p(x) and its negation can be written in the form ∃z∀ys(z, y, x),
where s(z, y, x) is a decidable predicate.5 In the theory of computability-in-principle (as opposed to, say,
complexity theory), by importance, the class of predicates of complexity ∆2 is only next to the classes of
decidable, semidecidable and co-semidecidable predicates. This class also plays a special role in logic: it is
known that a formula of classical predicate logic is valid if and only if it is true in every model where all
atoms of the formula are interpreted as predicates of complexity ∆2.
To see that recursive approximability of a predicate p(x) is equivalent to this predicate’s being of complex-
ity ∆2, first assume that p(x) is of complexity ∆2, so that p(x) = ∃z∀yq(z, y, x) and ¬p(x) = ∃z∀yr(z, y, x)
for some decidable predicates q(z, y, x) and r(z, y, x). Then⊓x
(
¬p(x) ∨ p(x)
)
is solved by the following strat-
egy. Wait till the environment specifies a value m for x, thus bringing the game down to ¬p(m) ∨ p(m).
Then initialize both i and j to 1, choose the p(m) component, and do the following:
Step 1: Check whether q(i, j,m) is true. If yes, increment j to j+1 and repeat Step 1. If not, switch to the
¬p(m) component, reset j to 1, and go to Step 2.
Step 2: Check whether r(i, j,m) is true. If yes, increment j to j+1 and repeat Step 2. If not, switch to the
p(m) component, reset j to 1, increment i to i+1, and go to Step 1.
With a moment’s thought, one can see that the above algorithm indeed solves ⊓x
(
¬p(x) ∨ p(x)
)
.
For the opposite direction, assume a given algorithm A solves ⊓x
(
¬p(x) ∨ p(x)
)
. Let q(z, y, x) be the
predicate such that q(i, j,m) is true iff, in the scenario where the environment specified x as m at the
beginning of the play, so that the game was brought down to ¬p(m) ∨ p(m), we have:
• at the ith computation step, A chose the p(m) component;
• at the jth computation step, A did not move.
Quite similarly, let r(z, y, x) be the predicate such that r(i, j,m) is true iff, in the scenario where the envi-
ronment specified x as m at the beginning of the play, so that the game was brought down to ¬p(m) ∨ p(m),
we have:
• either i=1 or, at the ith computation step, A chose the ¬p(m) component;
• at the jth computation step, A did not move.
Of course, both q(z, y, x) and r(z, y, x) are decidable predicates, and hence so are y>z → q(z, y, x) and
y>z → r(z, y, x). Now, it is not hard to see that p(x) = ∃z∀y
(
y>z → q(z, y, x)
)
and ¬p(x) = ∃z∀y
(
y>z →
r(z, y, x)
)
, so that p(x) is indeed of complexity ∆2.
As a real-life example of a predicate which is recursively approximable but neither semidecidable nor
co-semidecidable, consider the predicate k(x)<k(y), saying that number x is simpler than number y in the
sense of Kolmogorov complexity. It is known that k(z) (the Kolmogorov complexity of z) is bounded, never
exceeding the size (logarithm) |z| of z plus a certain constant c. Fix this c. Here is an algorithm which
recursively approximates the predicate k(x)<k(y), i.e., solves the problem
⊓x⊓y
(
¬k(x)<k(y)∨ k(x)<k(y)
)
.
Wait till the environment brings the game down to ¬k(m)<k(n) ∨ k(m)<k(n) for some m and n. Then start
simulating, in parallel, all Turing machines of sizes ≤min(|m|, |n|)+c on input 1. Whenever you see that
a machine t returns m and the size of t is smaller than that of any other previously found machines that
3Unless, of course, the procedure halts by good luck. Halting without saying “Yes” can then be seen as an explicit indication
that the original answer “No” was final.
4Cf. [3], Lemma 8.3.12.
5See Section 5.1 of [3] for a definition of all classes of the arithmetical hierarchy, including ∆n (n = 0, 1, 2, . . .).
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return m or n on input 1, choose k(m)<k(n). Quite similarly, whenever you see that a machine t returns n
and the size of t is smaller than that of any other previously found machine that returns n on input 1, as
well as smaller or equal to the size of any other previously found machines that return m on input 1, choose
¬k(m)<k(n). Obviously, the correct choice between ¬k(m)<k(n) and k(m)<k(n) will be made sooner or
later and never reconsidered afterwards. This will happen when the procedure hits — in the role of t — a
smallest machine that returns either m or n on input 1.
Once we have toggling disjunction, its dual operation of toggling conjunction A ∧B can be defined in a
fully symmetric way, with the roles of the machine and the environment interchanged. That is, here it is the
environment rather than the machine that makes choices. Equivalently, A ∧B can be defined as ¬(¬A ∨¬B).
The toggling versions of quantifiers and recurrences are defined in the same way as in the case of parallel
or sequential operations. Namely:
∧xA(x) = A(1) ∧A(2) ∧A(3) ∧ . . .
∨xA(x) = A(1) ∨A(2) ∨A(3) ∨ . . .
∧|A = A ∧A ∧A∧ . . .
∨|A = A ∨A ∨A∨ . . .
There is yet another natural sort ◦| , ◦| of toggling (co)recurrence operations worth considering. We call
these toggling-branching recurrence and toggling-branching corecurrence, respectively. Roughly, ◦| , ◦| are the
same to ◦
| , ◦| as ∧| , ∨| are to ∧| , ∨| . Namely, a play over ◦|A proceeds as over ◦|A, with the difference that now
⊤ is required to make a choice — which can be reconsidered any finite number of times — of a particular
session/branch of A out of the many sessions that are being played. As with all other toggling operations,
if choices are retracted infinitely many times, ⊤ loses. Otherwise, the winner in the overall game will be the
player which wins in the session of A that was chosen last. ◦|A, as expected, is the dual of ◦|A, which can be
defined by interchanging the roles of the two players, or by ◦|A = ¬◦| ¬A.
For our last example illustrating CoL operations at work, remember that Kolmogorov complexity k(x)
is not a computable function, i.e., the problem ⊓x⊔y
(
y=k(x)
)
has no algorithmic solution. However,
replacing ⊔y with ∨y in it yields an algorithmically solvable (yet nontrivial) problem. A solution for
⊓x∨y
(
y=k(x)
)
goes like this. Wait till the environment chooses a number m for x, thus bringing the game
down to ∨y
(
y=k(m)
)
, i.e., to
1=k(m) ∨ 2=k(m) ∨ 3=k(m) ∨ . . . (7)
Initialize i to a sufficiently large number, such as i= |m|+c (c is the constant mentioned earlier), and then
do the following routine:
ROUTINE: Choose the ith ∨ -disjunct of (7). Then start simulating on input 1, in parallel, all
Turing machines whose sizes are smaller than i. If and when you see that one of such machines
returns m, update i to the size of that machine, and repeat ROUTINE.
A similar argument convinces us that the problems ⊓x∨|⊔y
(
y=k(x)
)
and ⊓x◦|⊔y
(
y=k(x)
)
also have
algorithmic solutions. So do the problems ∧x∨y
(
y=k(x)
)
and ∧x∨y
(
y=k(x)
)
, but certainly not the
problem ∀x∨y
(
y=k(x)
)
.
3 Toggling and sequential operations defined formally
In what follows, we rely on the first six sections of [16] as an external source. Although long, [16] is very easy
to read and has a convenient glossary6 to look up any unfamiliar terms and symbols. A reader not familiar
with [16] or unwilling to do some parallel reading, may want to either stop here or just browse the rest of the
paper without attempting to go into the technical details of formal definitions and proofs. Due to the very
dynamic recent development, computability logic has already reached a point where it is no longer feasible
to reintroduce all relevant concepts all over again in each new paper on the subject — this would make any
significant or fast progress within the project near impossible.
6The glossary for the published version of [16] is given at the end of the book (rather than article), on pages 371-376. The
reader may instead use the preprint version of [16], available at http://arxiv.org/abs/cs.LO/0507045 The latter includes both
the main text and the glossary.
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Here we only provide formal definitions for the toggling and sequential operations. Definitions of all
other relevant operations are found in [16]. Definitions of sequential operations are also given in [15] in a
form technically different from our present one, but otherwise yielding equivalent (in every reasonable sense)
concepts, and whether to adopt the definitions of [15] or the present definitions of sequential operations is
purely a matter of taste or convenience. As for toggling operations, they have never been defined before.
In the definitions of this section, following [16], we use the notation Γα — where Γ is a run and α is a
string — for the result of deleting from Γ all labmoves (labeled moves) except those that have the form ℘αβ
for some string β and player ℘, and then further replacing each such remaining labmove ℘αβ by ℘β.
Definition 3.1 Let A1, . . . , An (n ≥ 2) be any constant games. Let us agree that, in the context of a toggling
or sequential disjunction or conjunction of these games, a switch move — or just a switch — means the
move/string i for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n} (here we identify natural numbers with their decimal representations).
When there are finitely many switches in a run Γ, by the active component of a toggling or sequential
combination of A1, . . . , An in Γ we mean Ai such that i is the last (rightmost) switch move in Γ; in case
there are no switch moves in Γ at all, A1 is considered to be the active component. The components other
than the active one are said to be dormant.
1. The toggling disjunction A1 ∨ . . . ∨An of A1, . . . , An is defined as follows:
• A position Φ is a legal position of A1 ∨ . . . ∨An iff every move of Φ is either a switch by ⊤, or the
move i.α by either player, where i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and α is some string, and the following condition
is satisfied: for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Φi. is a legal position of Ai.
• Let Γ be a legal run of A1 ∨ . . . ∨An. Then Γ is a ⊤-won run of A1 ∨ . . . ∨An iff there are finitely
many switches (by ⊤) in Γ and, where Ai is the active component of A1 ∨ . . . ∨An in Γ, Γi. is a
⊤-won run of Ai.
2. The toggling conjunction A1 ∧ . . . ∧An of A1, . . . , An is defined as follows:
• A position Φ is a legal position of A1 ∧ . . . ∧An iff every move of Φ is either a switch by ⊥, or
is the move i.α by either player, where i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and α is some string, and the following
condition is satisfied: for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Φi. is a legal position of Ai.
• Let Γ be a legal run of A1 ∧ . . . ∧An. Then Γ is a ⊥-won run of A1 ∧ . . . ∧An iff there are finitely
many switches (by ⊥) in Γ and, where Ai is the active component of A1 ∧ . . . ∧An in Γ, Γ
i. is a
⊥-won run of Ai.
3. The sequential disjunction A1 ▽ . . . ▽An of A1, . . . , An is defined exactly as A1 ∨ . . . ∨An, with
the only difference that, in order for a position Φ to be a legal position of A1 ▽ . . . ▽An, it should
satisfy the following additional condition: Whenever i1, i2, . . . , ij is the sequence of the switch moves
made (by ⊤) in Φ, we have i1=2, i2=3, . . . , ij =j+1.
4. The sequential conjunction A1 △ . . . △An of A1, . . . , An is defined exactly as A1 ∧ . . . ∧An, with
the only difference that, in order for a position Φ to be a legal position of A1 △ . . . △An, it should
satisfy the following additional condition: Whenever i1, i2, . . . , ij is the sequence of the switch moves
made (by ⊥) in Φ, we have i1=2, i2=3, . . . , ij =j+1.
As we see, a legal run Γ of A1 ∨ . . . ∨An is nothing but a legal run of A1 ∨ . . . ∨ An with perhaps some
switch moves by ⊤ inserted. As in the case of ∨, such a Γ is seen as a parallel play in the n components,
with the play (run) in each component Ai being Γ
i.. The meaning of a switch move is that of a retractable
choice of a disjunct. As we remember from [16], in order to win a parallel disjunction, it is sufficient for ⊤ to
win in any one of its disjuncts. Winning a toggling disjunction is harder: here it is necessary for ⊤ to win in
the disjunct that was chosen last. The difference between A1 ∨ . . . ∨An and A1 ▽ . . . ▽An is that, while in
the former switches/choices can go back and forth and the same component can be re-chosen many times,
in the latter the chosen component should always be the one next after the previously chosen component.
And, as always, either sort of conjunction is a dual of the corresponding sort of disjunction, obtained from
it by interchanging the roles of ⊤ and ⊥.
A reasonable behavior in a toggling or sequential combination of static games by either player is to always
assume that the latest choice of a component is final, correspondingly play only in the (currently) active
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component of the combination, and worry about the other components only if and when they become active.
This is so because eventually the outcome of the game will be determined by what happened in the (then)
active component. If there are strategically useful moves in a dormant component, they can always wait
till that component becomes active (if and when this happens), as postponing moves in a static game never
hurts a player. Yet, this “reasonable” behavior is not enforced by the rules of the game, and “unreasonable”
yet innocent actions such as making moves in dormant components are legal. This particular design choice
in Definition 3.1 has been made purely for the considerations of simplicity. Alternative definitions that yield
equivalent operations but are more restrictive/demanding on legal behaviors are not hard to come up with.
One example is the definition of sequential operations given in [15]. In any case, however, obtaining such
definitions would not be just as straightforward as declaring all moves in dormant components illegal — doing
so could violate the important condition that the operations should preserve the static property of games. As
we remember from [16], computability logic and its static games are asynchronous-communication-friendly.
If the communication between the two players is asynchronous, ⊥ (in the case of ∨ or ▽ ) or ⊤ (in the case
of ∧ or △ ) cannot be sure that the component it considers “active” and in which it wants to make a move
is indeed still active; it is possible that the component has already been “deactivated” by the adversary, but
this information has not arrived yet.
As an aside, the existence of a variety of alternative definitions for our game operations and their robust-
ness (modulo equivalence) with respect to technical variations is a strong indication of the naturalness of
those operations. This is in the same sense as the existence of many equivalent versions of Turing machines
and other models of computation, and the robustness of the class of computable functions with respect to
those variations, is one of the strongest pieces of empirical evidence in favor of the Church-Turing thesis.
Among the interesting alternatives to our present definitions of the four sorts of disjunctions, most clearly
showing the similarities and differences between them, is the following. (1) Keep the definition of ∨ (from
[16]) unchanged. (2) Define ∨ as in Definition 3.1, with the only difference that not having made any
switch/choice moves is now considered a loss for ⊤ (there is no “default” choice, that is). (3) Define ▽ as
the version of (the new) ∨ where the choices are required to be consecutive numbers starting from 1. (4)
Define ⊔ as the version of (the new) ∨ where one single choice is allowed. Thus, the differences between the
four disjunctions are in how many (if any) choices, and in what order, are required or allowed.
For the sake of readability, in the sequel we will often employ relaxed, intuitive and semiformal terminology
when referring to moves, typically naming them by their meanings or effects on the game instead of the actual
strings that those moves are. Consider, for example, the game (A ⊔B) ∧
(
(C ⊓D) ∨ (E ⊓ F )
)
and the legal
run 〈⊤1.1,⊥2.1.1,⊤2.2,⊥2.2.2,⊤2.1〉 of it. We may say that:
• The effect of the move 1.1 by ⊤ is (or such a move signifies) choosing A within the A⊔B component.
Notice that after this move is made in (A ⊔ B) ∧
(
(C ⊓ D) ∧ (E ⊓ F )
)
, the game is brought down
to — in the sense that it continues as — A ∧
(
(C ⊓D)∨ (E ⊓ F )
)
. We may also refer to making the
move 1.1 in the overall game as making the move 1 in its left ∧-conjunct, because this is exactly the
meaning of the move 1.1.
• The effect of the next move 2.1.1 by ⊥ is choosing C in the C ⊓D component. Such a move further
brings the game down to A ∧
(
C ∨ (E ⊓ F )
)
.
• The effect of the next, switch move 2.2 by ⊤ is activating the right component of C ∨ (E ⊓ F ), or
switching from C to E ⊓ F in it. Remember that initially the active component of a toggling combi-
nation is always the leftmost component. Such a component in our case was C⊓D, which later became
(evolved to) C.
• The effect of the next move 2.2.2 by ⊥ is choosing F in the E ⊓ F component. This brings the overall
game down to A ∧ (C ∨F ), where the active (sub)component within the C ∨F component is F .
• The effect of the last move 2.1 by ⊤ is switching from F back to C in the C ∨F component, i.e. making
the right component dormant and the left component active, as was the case when the game started.
Definition 3.1 straightforwardly extends from the n-ary cases to the infinite cases A1 ∨A2 ∨ . . ., A1 ∧
A2 ∧ . . ., A1 ▽A2 ▽ . . . and A1 △A2 △ . . . by just changing “i ∈ {1, . . . , n}” to “i ∈ {1, 2, . . .}”.
Even though we have officially defined ∨, ∧, ▽, △ only for constant games, our definitions extend to
all games in the standard way, as explained in the second paragraph of Section 4 of [16]. Namely, for any
not-necessarily-constant games A1, . . . , An, A1 ∨ . . . ∨An is the unique game such that, for any valuation
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(assignment of constants to variables) e, we have e[A1 ∨ . . . ∨An] = e[A1] ∨ . . . ∨ e[An]. Similarly for
∧, ▽, △ and the infinite versions of ∨, ∧, ▽, △. (The meaning of the notation e[. . .], just like the meanings
of any other unfamiliar terms or notations, as already noted, can and should be looked up in [16].)
Whenever new game operations are introduced, one needs to make sure that they preserve the static
property of games, for otherwise many things can go wrong:
Theorem 3.2 The class of static games is closed under (both the n-ary and the infinite versions of)
∨ , ∧ , ▽ , △ .
Proof. Given in Appendix A.
The remaining definitions of this section are not relevant to the subsequent sections of the paper, and we
include them here just for the purposes of officially registering all toggling operations (and re-registering all
sequential operations) as full-fledged inhabitants of the operation zoo of computability logic.
The toggling and sequential sorts of quantifiers and (co)recurrences, as we already know from
Section 2, are defined as follows:
Definition 3.3 For any games A or A(x):
1. ∧|A = A ∧A ∧A ∧ . . . and ∨|A = A∨A ∨A ∨ . . .;
2. −∧
|A = A△A△A△ . . . and
−∨
|A = A▽A▽A▽ . . .;
3. ∧xA(x) = A(1) ∧A(2) ∧A(3) ∧ . . . and ∨xA(x) = A(1) ∨A(2) ∨A(3) ∨ . . .;
4. △xA(x) = A(1)△A(2)△A(3)△ . . . and ▽xA(x) = A(1)▽A(2)▽A(3)▽ . . ..
It is not hard to see that the DeMorgan dualities hold for the toggling and sequential operations, just as
they do for all other groups of operations (parallel, choice, branching, blind). Namely, we have:
¬(A1 ∧ . . . ∧An) = ¬A1 ∨ . . . ∨¬An,
¬(A1 ∨ . . . ∨An) = ¬A1 ∧ . . . ∧¬An,
and similarly for sequential conjunction and disjunction, as well as infinite versions of toggling and sequential
operations, including ◦|A, ◦|A, ∧xA(x), ∨xA(x), −∧|A,
−∨
|A, △xA(x), ▽xA(x).
Defining the toggling-branching group ◦| , ◦| of (co)recurrences is not as easy as defining the (just)
toggling group ∧| , ∨| . Let us first reproduce — or, perhaps rather rephrase — from [16], in a compact form,
the definition of branching recurrence ◦
| and the associated intuitions.
In semiformal terms, a play of ◦
|A starts as an ordinary play of game A. At any time, however, player ⊥
is allowed to make a “replicative move”, which creates two copies of the current position Φ of A. From that
point on, the game turns into two games played in parallel, each continuing from position Φ. We use the bits
0 and 1 to denote those two threads — threads that have a common past (position Φ) but possibly diverging
futures. Again, at any time, ⊥ can further branch either thread, creating two copies of the current position
in that thread. If thread 0 was branched, the resulting two threads will be denoted by 00 and 01; and if the
branched thread was 1, then the resulting threads will be denoted by 10 and 11. And so on: at any time, ⊥
may split any of the existing threads w into two threads w0 and w1. Each thread in the eventual run of the
game will be thus denoted by a (possibly infinite) bit string. The game is considered won by ⊤ if it wins A
in each of the threads; otherwise the winner is ⊥.
In fully formal terms, there are two types of legal moves in (legal) positions of ◦
|A: (1) replicative and
(2) non-replicative. To define these, let us agree that by an actual node7 of a position Φ we mean a bit
string w such that w either is empty,8 or else is u0 or u1 for some bit string u such that Φ contains the move
u:. A replicative move can only be made by (is only legal for) ⊥, and such a move in a given position Φ
should be w:, where w is an actual node of Φ and Φ does not already contain the same move w:.9 As for
non-replicative moves, they can be made by either player. Such a move by a player ℘ in a given position Φ
should be w.α, where w is an actual node of Φ and α is a move such that, for any infinite bit string v, α is
7Intuitively, an actual node is (the name of) an already existing thread of a play over A.
8Intuitively, the empty string is the name/address of the initial thread; all other threads will be descendants of that thread.
9The intuitive meaning of move w: is splitting thread w into w0 and w1, thus “actualizing” these two new nodes/threads.
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a legal move by ℘ in position Φwv of A.10 Here and later, for a run Θ and bit string x, Θx means the
result of deleting from Θ all moves except those that look like u.β for some initial segment u of x, and then
further deleting the prefix “u.” from such moves.11 A legal run Γ of ◦
|A is considered won by ⊥ iff, for some
infinite bit string v, Γv is a ⊥-won run of A. This completes our definition of ◦
| .
Now we are ready to define ◦|A. The legal runs of this game are defined as those of ◦
|A, with the only
difference that the former can now include any number of “switch” moves made by ⊥ (and only ⊥). Each
switch move made in a position Φ is nothing but one of the actual nodes of Φ. Next, a legal run Γ is
considered won by ⊥ iff there are only finitely many switch moves made in it and, where w is the last one of
such moves and v is w with infinitely many 0s appended to it, Γv is a ⊥-won run of A. If no switch moves
were made at all, the above w is assumed to be the empty bit string, so that v is the infinite string of 0s.
This completes our definition of ◦| . The operation ◦| is defined by interchanging ⊥ with ⊤ in this definition.
Equivalently, it can be defined by ◦|A = ¬◦| ¬A.
We claim that, just like all other operations defined in this section, the operations ◦| and ◦| preserve the
static property of games. This claim can be proven by adapting to ◦| the proof of the similar theorem about
◦
| given in [4]. The latter is fairly technical, for which reason we let the present claim remain without a proof
— no results of this paper depend on it, anyway.
4 Logic CL13
In this section we introduce the new propositional system CL13.12 The building blocks of its language are:
• Infinitely many nonlogical elementary atoms, for which we use the metavariables p, q, r, s.
• Infinitely many nonlogical general atoms, for which we use the metavariables P,Q,R, S.
• The 0-ary operators ⊤ and ⊥. They can as well be called logical atoms.
• The unary operator ¬.
• The operators ∧, ∨, ∧, ∨, △, ▽, ⊓, ⊔. Their arities are not fixed and can be any n ≥ 2.13
Formulas, to which we refer as CL13-formulas, are built from atoms and operators in the standard
way, with the requirement (yielding no loss of expressiveness) that ¬ can only be applied to nonlogical atoms.
A literal means L or ¬L, where L is an atom. Such a literal is said to be elementary, general, nonlogical or
logical if L is so. When F is not a nonlogical atom, ¬F is understood as an abbreviation defined by:
• ¬¬E = E;
• ¬⊤ = ⊥ and ¬⊥ = ⊤;
• ¬(E1 ∧ . . . ∧ En) = ¬E1 ∨ . . . ∨ ¬En and ¬(E1 ∨ . . . ∨ En) = ¬E1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬En;
• ¬(E1 ∧ . . . ∧En) = ¬E1 ∨ . . . ∨¬En and ¬(E1 ∨ . . . ∨En) = ¬E1 ∧ . . . ∧¬En;
• ¬(E1 △ . . . △En) = ¬E1 ▽ . . . ▽ ¬En and ¬(E1 ▽ . . . ▽En) = ¬E1 △ . . . △¬En;
• ¬(E1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ En) = ¬E1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ ¬En and ¬(E1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ En) = ¬E1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ ¬En.
Also, if we write E → F , it is to be understood as an abbreviation of ¬E ∨ F . Simplicity is the only
reason for our choice to treat → and ¬ as abbreviations: doing otherwise would lengthen the definition of
system CL13, as well as the related proofs, due to the necessity to additionally/separately consider the
cases of negative occurrences of operators in formulas. Note that our design choice does not yield any loss
10The intuitive meaning of such a move w.α is making move α in thread w and all of its (current or future) descendants.
11Intuitively, Θx is the run of A that has been played in thread x, if such a thread exists (has been generated); otherwise,
Θx is the run of A that has been played in (the unique) existing thread which (whose name, that is) is some initial segment
of x.
12In this name, “CL” stands for “computability logic”, and “13” indicates that this is the 13th formal system for CoL
introduced so far.
13The reason why we do not restrict these operators to their strictly binary versions is that doing so could lengthen rather
than shorten many definitions and proofs. This is related to the fact that, while the games (A ∧ B) ∧ C and A ∧ B ∧ C are
certainly equivalent, they are still not the same unless A,B, C are elementary. Similarly for ∨,⊓,⊔.
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of expressive power: the games A→ B and ¬A ∨B are not only equivalent, but simply equal; similarly for
¬¬A vs.A, ¬(A ∧B) vs.¬A ∨ ¬B, etc.
Parentheses will often be omitted for the sake of readability. When doing so, we agree that ¬ has the
highest precedence, and→ has the lowest precedence. So, for instance, ¬P ⊔Q→ R ∧S means ((¬P )⊔Q)→
(R ∧S).
Formulas that do not contain general atoms we call elementary-base. This terminology also extends
to the corresponding fragment of CL13. In particular, the elementary-base fragment of CL13 is the set of
all elementary-base theorems of CL13.
An interpretation for the language of CL13 is a function ∗ that sends each nonlogical elementary atom
p to an elementary game p∗, and sends each general atom P to any, not-necessarily-elementary, static game
P ∗. This mapping extends to all formulas by letting it respect all logical operators as the corresponding
game operations. That is, ⊤∗ = ⊤, (E ∧F )∗ = E∗ ∧F ∗, etc. When F ∗ = A, we say that ∗ interprets F
as A.
Recall, from [16], the models HPM (“hard-play machine”) and EPM (“easy-play machine”) of interactive
computation. Very briefly, an HPM is Turing machine with the capability of making moves and with full
reading access to all relevant information on the game played, such as its “current” position at any given
time, as well as the “actual” values of the parameters (variables) on which the game may depend; the
environment can make any number of moves at any computation step of an HPM, with such moves being
the only nondeterministic events from the HPM’s perspective. An EPM means the same, with the difference
that the environment can move only when the machine explicitly “grants permission” to do so, with the
machine required to grant permission infinitely many times during the play. CoL defines computability of a
game as existence of an HPM that wins the game against every possible behavior of the environment. It has
been shown that, when the games under question are static, replacing “HPM” with “EPM” in this definition
yields (extensionally) the same concept of computability. Since our interpretations are required to interpret
atoms as static games and all of our game operations preserve the static property of games, the two — HPM
and EPM — models of computation are equivalent in every relevant respect.
A formula F is said to be valid iff, for every interpretation ∗, the game F ∗ is computable. And F is
uniformly valid iff there is an EPM (or, equivalently, HPM) S, called a uniform solution of F , such
that S wins (computes) F ∗ for every interpretation ∗. See Sections 7 and 8 of [16] for a discussion of the
intuitions associated with these concepts.
Our treatment further relies of the following terminology, notation and conventions:
• We often need to differentiate between subformulas as such, and particular occurrences of subformulas.
We will be using the term osubformula (“o” for “occurrence”) to mean a subformula together with
a particular occurrence. The prefix “o” will be used with a similar meaning in terms such as oatom,
oliteral, etc. So, for instance, the formula P ∧ Q → P has two atoms but three oatoms. Yet, we
may still say “the oatom P”, assuming that it is clear from the context which of the possibly many
occurrences of P is meant. Similarly for osubformulas and oliterals.
• An occurrence of an osubformula is positive iff it is not in the scope of ¬. Otherwise it is negative.
According to our conventions regarding the usage of ¬, only oatoms may be negative.
• An occurrence of an osubformula is positive iff it is not in the scope of ¬. Otherwise it is negative.
According to our conventions regarding the usage of ¬, only oatoms may be negative.
• A politeral is a positive oliteral.
• A ∧ -(sub)formula is a (sub)formula of the form F1 ∧ . . . ∧Fn. Similarly for ∨, ∧,∨, △,▽, ⊓, ⊔.
• A sequential (sub)formula is one of the form F1 △ . . . △ Fn or F1 ▽ . . . ▽Fn. We say that F1 is
the head of such a (sub)formula, and F2, . . . , Fn form its tail.
• Similarly, a parallel (sub)formula is one of the form F1 ∧ . . . ∧ Fn or F1 ∨ . . . ∨ Fn, a toggling
(sub)formula is one of the form F1 ∧ . . . ∧Fn or F1 ∨ . . . ∨Fn, and a choice (sub)formula is one
of the form F1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Fn or F1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Fn.
• A formula is said to be quasielementary iff it contains no general atoms and no operators other than
¬,⊤,⊥,∧,∨, ∧, ∨.
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• A formula is said to be elementary iff it is a formula of classical propositional logic, i.e., contains no
general atoms and no operators other than ¬,⊤,⊥,∧,∨.
• A semisurface osubformula (or occurrence) is an osubformula (or occurrence) that is not in the
scope of any choice connectives (i.e., ⊓ and ⊔).
• A surface osubformula (or occurrence) is an osubformula (or occurrence) that is not in the scope
of any connectives other than ¬,∧,∨.
• The quasielementarization of a formula F , denoted by |F |, is the result of replacing in F every
sequential osubformula by its head, every ⊓-osubformula by ⊤, every ⊔-osubformula by ⊥, and every
general politeral by ⊥ (the order of these replacements does not matter). For instance,
|((P ∨ q) ∨ ((p ∧ ¬P )△ (Q ∧R))) ∧ (q ⊓ (r ⊔ s))| = ((⊥∨ q) ∨ (p ∧ ⊥))∧⊤.
• The elementarization of a quasielementary formula F , denoted by ‖F‖, is the result of replacing in
F every ∧ -osubformula by ⊤ and every ∨ -osubformula by ⊥ (again, the order of these replacements
does not matter). For instance,
‖(s ∧ (p ∧ (q ∨ r))) ∨ (¬s ∨ (p ∨ r))‖ = (s ∧ ⊤) ∨ (¬s ∨ ⊥).
• A quasielementary formula F is said to be stable iff its elementarization ‖F‖ is a tautology of classical
logic. Otherwise F is instable.
Definition 4.1 We define our deductive system CL13 by the following six rules of inference, where
P 7→ F means “from premise(s) P conclude F”:
(∧): ~H 7→ F , where F is a stable quasielementary formula, and ~H the smallest set of formulas satisfying the
following condition:
• Whenever F has a surface osubformula E1 ∧ . . . ∧En, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ~H contains the
result of replacing in F that osubformula by Ei.
(∨): H 7→ F , where F is a quasielementary formula, and H is the result of replacing in F a surface
osubformula E1 ∨ . . . ∨En by Ei for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
(△⊓): |F |, ~H 7→ F , where F is a non-quasielementary formula (note that otherwise F = |F |), and ~H is the
smallest set of formulas satisfying the following two conditions:
• Whenever F has a semisurface osubformula E1 ⊓ . . .⊓En, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ~H contains the
result of replacing in F that osubformula by Ei.
• Whenever F has a semisurface osubformula E1 △E2 △ . . . △En, ~H contains the result of replac-
ing in F that osubformula by E2 △ . . . △En.
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We will be referring to the above formula |F | as the senior premise of the rule (or its conclusion),
and referring to the formulas of ~H as junior premises.
(⊔): H 7→ F , where H is the result of replacing in F a semisurface osubformula E1⊔ . . .⊔En by Ei for some
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
(▽): H 7→ F , where H is the result of replacing in F a semisurface osubformula E1 ▽E2 ▽ . . . ▽En by
E2 ▽ . . . ▽En.
14
(M): H 7→ F , where H is the result of replacing in F two — one positive and one negative — semisurface
occurrences of some general atom P by a nonlogical elementary atom p that does not occur in F .
14In this definition and later, if n=2, E2△ . . .△En or E2▽ . . .▽En is simply understood as E2.
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Axioms are not explicitly stated, but the set of premises of the (∧) rule can be empty, in which case (the
conclusion of) this rule acts like an axiom.
A CL13-proof of a formula F can be defined as a sequence of formulas ending with F such that every
formula follows from some (possibly empty) set of earlier formulas by one of the rules of the system.
Example 4.2 In view of the discussions of Section 2.9, the formula (¬p ∨ p) ∧ (¬q ∨ q)→ ¬(p ∧ q) ∨ (p∧ q)
expresses — or rather implies — the known fact that, if two predicates p and q are recursively approximable,
then so is their intersection p ∧ q. The following sequence is a CL13-proof of this formula, re-written into
its official form
(
(p ∧¬p) ∨ (q ∧¬q)
)
∨
(
(¬p ∨ ¬q) ∨ (p ∧ q)
)
:
1. (p ∨ q) ∨ (¬p ∨ ¬q) (∧): {}
2. (p ∨ q) ∨
(
(¬p ∨ ¬q) ∨ (p ∧ q)
)
(∨): 1
3. (p ∨ ¬q) ∨ (¬p ∨ ¬q) (∧): {}
4. (p ∨ ¬q) ∨
(
(¬p ∨ ¬q) ∨ (p ∧ q)
)
(∨): 3
5.
(
p ∨ (q ∧¬q)
)
∨
(
(¬p ∨ ¬q) ∨ (p ∧ q)
)
(∧): {2,4}
6. (¬p ∨ q) ∨ (¬p ∨ ¬q) (∧): {}
7. (¬p ∨ q) ∨
(
(¬p ∨ ¬q) ∨ (p ∧ q)
)
(∨): 6
8. (¬p ∨ ¬q) ∨ (p ∧ q) (∧): {}
9. (¬p ∨ ¬q) ∨
(
(¬p ∨ ¬q) ∨ (p ∧ q)
)
(∨): 8
10.
(
¬p ∨ (q ∧¬q)
)
∨
(
(¬p ∨ ¬q) ∨ (p ∧ q)
)
(∧): {7,9}
11.
(
(p ∧¬p) ∨ q
)
∨
(
(¬p ∨ ¬q) ∨ (p ∧ q)
)
(∧): {2,7}
12.
(
(p ∧¬p) ∨ ¬q
)
∨
(
(¬p ∨ ¬q) ∨ (p ∧ q)
)
(∧): {4,9}
13.
(
(p ∧¬p) ∨ (q ∧¬q)
)
∨
(
(¬p ∨ ¬q) ∨ (p ∧ q)
)
(∧): {5,10,11,12}
Example 4.3 Pick any two distinct connectives AND1 and AND2 from the list ∧, ∧, △, ⊓. Then CL13
proves the formula PAND1Q→ PAND2Q if and only if AND1 is to the left of AND2 in the list. Similarly for
the list ⊔, ▽, ∨, ∨. Below we verify this fact only for the case {AND1,AND2} = {∧,△}. The reader may
want to try some other combinations as exercises.
Here is a CL13-proof of P ∧Q→ P △Q:
1. ¬p ∨ p (∧): {}
2. (¬p ∨⊥) ∨ p (∨): 1
3. ¬q ∨ q (∧): {}
4. (¬p ∨¬q) ∨ q (∨): 3
5. (¬p ∨¬Q) ∨Q (M): 4
6. (¬p ∨¬Q) ∨ (p△Q) (△⊓): {2,5}
7. (¬P ∨¬Q) ∨ (P △Q) (M): 6
On the other hand, the formula P △Q → P ∧Q, i.e. (¬P ▽ ¬Q) ∨ (P ∧Q), has no proof. This can
be shown through attempting and failing to construct, bottom-up, a purported CL13-proof of the formula.
Here we explore one of the branches of a proof-search tree. (¬P ▽¬Q) ∨ (P ∧Q) is not quasielementary, so
it could not be derived by (be the conclusion of) the (∨) or (∧) rule. The (⊔) rule does not apply either,
as there is no ⊔ in the formula. This leaves us with one of the rules (▽), (△⊓) and (M). Let us see what
happens if our target formula is derived by (▽). In this case the premise should be ¬Q ∨ (P ∧Q). The
latter can be derived only by (△⊓) or (M). Again, let us try (M). The premise in this subcase should be
¬q ∨ (P ∧ q) for some elementary atom q. But the only way ¬q ∨ (P ∧ q) can be derived is by (△⊓) from the
premise ¬q ∨ (⊥∧ q). This formula, in turn, could only be derived by (∧), in which case ¬q ∨⊥ is one of the
premises. Now we are obviously stuck, as ¬q ∨⊥ is not the conclusion of any of the rules of the system. We
thus hit a dead end. All remaining possibilities can be checked in a similar routine/analytic way, and the
outcome in each case will be a dead end.
Exercise 4.4 Construct CL13-proofs of formulas (3) and (4) from Section 2.7.
In similar analytic exercises, one can verify that the provabilities (⊢) and unprovabilities (6⊢) shown in
the following table hold. From the table we can see that each sort of disjunction exhibits a unique logical
behavior even when taken in isolation from the other sorts. The same, of course, is the case for conjunctions.
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OR = ∨ OR = ∨ OR = ▽ OR = ⊔
¬P OR P ⊢ 6⊢ 6⊢ 6⊢
P ORQ→ QOR P ⊢ ⊢ 6⊢ ⊢
P OR P → P 6⊢ 6⊢ 6⊢ ⊢
p OR p→ p ⊢ ⊢ ⊢ ⊢
The present version of CL13 is not syntactically optimal in the sense that certain alternative design
choices could offer considerably shorter proofs. Namely, the (∧) rule and, especially, the (△⊓) rule are
generally quite expensive in that they may sometimes require too many premises. Optimizing (at the
expense of simplicity) the system or finding various shortcuts (admissible rules) to reduce proof sizes would
be a purely syntactic job which is beyond the scope of the present paper. Below we only point out — without
a proof — one of the ways to improve the efficiency of proofs and analytic proof-search procedures:
Claim 4.5 The set of CL13-provable formulas would remain the same if we redefined the concept of a
semisurface occurrence by imposing the additional condition that such an occurrence should not be in the
tail of any sequential osubformula.
Below comes our main theorem. Its soundness part will be proven in Section 5, and its completeness part
will be proven in Section 7.
Theorem 4.6 CL13 ⊢ F iff F is valid (for any CL13-formula F ). Furthermore:
a) There is an effective procedure that takes a CL13-proof of an arbitrary formula F and constructs an
EPM S such that, for every interpretation ∗, S computes F ∗.
b) If CL13 6⊢ F , then F ∗ is not computable for some interpretation ∗ that interprets all elementary atoms
of F as finitary predicates of arithmetical complexity ∆3, and interprets all general atoms of F as problems
of the form (A11 ⊔ . . . ⊔ A
1
m) ⊓ . . . ⊓ (A
m
1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ A
m
m), where each A
j
i is a finitary predicate of arithmetical
complexity ∆3.
The following facts are immediate corollaries of Theorem 4.6, so we state them without proofs:
Fact 4.7 A CL13-formula is valid iff it is uniformly valid.
Fact 4.8 CL13 is a conservative extension of classical logic. That is, an elementary formula is provable in
CL13 iff it is a classical tautology.
In addition, one can easily see that CL13 is closed under the standard rules of logic, such as Modus
Ponens and Substitution, provided that, when applying Substitution, elementary atoms are only replaced
by elementary formulas.
It is also worth noting that CL13 is decidable, with a brute force decision algorithm obviously running
in at most polynomial space. Whether there are more efficient algorithms is unknown.
The remaining sections of this paper are devoted to a proof of Theorem 4.6. Two immediate predecessors
of that theorem are similar results proven in [6] for the △, ▽, ∧, ∨ -free fragment CL2 of CL13, and in
[15] for the ∧, ∨ -free fragment CL9 of CL13. The proofs of both soundness and completeness given in [6]
were very detailed, to the extent of being pedantically so. As a result, they were fairly long, even though
concerning a relatively modest and simple fragment of the logic. The soundness and completeness proofs
given in [15] were less detailed, yet still pretty formal. The proofs given in the present paper are far less
detailed and quite informal. Continuing proving things in full technical detail in the earlier style would make
both writing and reading papers in CoL increasingly difficult, as the studies of the subject advance and the
depth and breadth of the results keep increasing. The proofs given in [6, 15] can serve as illustrations of
the fact that relaxed and semiformal arguments like the ones relied upon in the present paper can always
be turned into strict formal proofs if necessary. The proofs given in the following sections are meant for an
advanced reader who has well internalized the concepts and techniques of computability logic.
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5 The soundness of CL13
Very briefly, the idea behind our soundness proof for CL13 can be outlined as follows. Every CL13-proof
of a formula F , in fact, encodes an input- and interpretation-independent winning strategy (EPM) S for
F ∗. This is a recursive strategy, which acts depending on by which of the rules of CL13 the formula was
obtained from its its premise(s).
If F is derived by (∨), S makes a move signifying a switch to the corresponding ∨ -disjunct in the
corresponding subgame of F , this way essentially bringing the game F down to its premise. For instance, if
F is E ∧ (G1 ∨G2) and it is derived from E ∧ G2, then 2.2 is such a move. After this, S calls itself on the
premise, which, by the induction hypothesis, it knows how to win. Similarly, if F is derived by (⊔), S makes
a move signifying a choice of the corresponding ⊔-disjunct in the corresponding subgame of F ; and if F is
derived by (▽), S makes a move signifying a switch to the next (second) ▽ -disjunct in the corresponding
subgame of F .
Next, suppose F is derived by the (M) rule from the premise H , namely, H is the result of replacing,
in F , two general politerals P,¬P by some elementary politerals p,¬p. This is a signal for S that, from
now on, through applying copycat, its should “match”, i.e. “synchronize”, the corresponding two subgames
(the ones now represented by p and ¬p) to ensure that they evolve in essentially the same ways, so that,
eventually, one of them will be won. This allows us to safely pretend (at least in our present, very relaxed
description/analysis) that the games represented by p and ¬p are elementary (with one being the negation
of the other) and thus the game played by S from now on is, in fact, H . The latter, by the induction
hypothesis, will be won.
Next, suppose F is derived by the (△⊓) rule. Then S simply plays |F | (the senior premise of F ) until
the environment makes a move signifying a choice of a ⊓- or △ -conjunct in some ⊓- or △ -subgame of
F , in which case S quits its play of |F | and calls itself on the corresponding junior premise of F , which it
wins according to the induction hypothesis. If, however, the above event never occurs, the overall play will
finish (or continue forever) as a play of |F | which, by the induction hypothesis, will be won by S. This,
in turn, can be seen to imply that F will also be won, because playing F in the scenario where no moves
associated with its choice and sequential components are made, essentially means nothing but simply playing
the quasielementarization |F | of F .
Finally, suppose F is derived by (∧). This is the hardest case to explain in non-technical terms and, for
simplicity, let us assume that F has a single surface occurrence of a ∧ -subformula, namely of E1 ∧ . . . ∧En.
As we remember, the default active (“chosen”) ∧ -conjunct of such a component is E1. Let us write Ei
instead, because the original value 1 of i may change later, anyway. Let Hi be the premise of F resulting
from the latter by replacing E1 ∧ . . . ∧En with its active component Ei. What S does in this case is that
it simply plays Hi, which it knows how to win (by the induction hypothesis), and winning which means
winning F as long as Ei remains active. Such a play may, however, be interrupted by one of the following
events. One possible event is that, while S is playing Hi, the environment “activates” some new ∧ -conjunct
Ej of the E1 ∧ . . . ∧En component of F . Then S abandons its play of Hi and switches to a play of Hj
instead, where Hj is the corresponding premise of F . Another possibility is that the current play of F ,
itself, is taking place within a procedure call by a previous similar procedure associated with a (∧)-derived
formula F ′ (which, for simplicity, we also assume to have a single surface occurrence of a ∧ -subformula),
and the environment suddenly “changes its mind” and activates a new ∧ -conjunct of the ∧ -subcomponent
of that F ′. Then, again, S abandons its current play of Hi and switches to a play of H ′j , where H
′
j is the
corresponding premise of F ′. Yet another possibility is that the current play of F is taking place within
a procedure call by a previous procedure associated with a (△⊓)-derived formula F ′, and the environment
makes a move that signifies a choice of a ⊓-conjunct or a (new) △ -conjunct in some ⊓- or △ -subcomponent
of that F ′. In this case, S abandons F and calls itself on the corresponding premise of F ′. After properly
taking care of certain details that we have suppressed and (over)simplified, this strategy can be shown to
guarantee a win for S.
But, again, the above was just a rough preliminary description of the proof idea. What follows is a
relatively detailed materialization of that outline. We start by stating the following general fact, which is a
reproduction of Lemma 4.7 of [4]:
Lemma 5.1 Assume A is a constant static game, ℘ is either player, ¬℘ is ℘’s adversary (the other player),
and Υ,Ω are runs such that Ω is a ℘-delay of Υ. Then:
1. If Ω is a ℘-illegal run of A, then so is Υ.
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2. If Υ is a ¬℘-illegal run of A, then so is Ω.
Throughout this section, we fix F as an arbitrary CL13-provable formula. Our goal is to (show how to)
construct a uniform solution for F .
We fix a CL13-proof T of F . In the preceding section, such a proof would be presented in the form of
a sequence of formulas. But now we prefer to see T as a tree. Namely, T is a tree where with each node
b is associated — let us say F-associated — a formula, which we denote by F(b), such that the formula
associated with the root is F and, for each node b of T , whenever c1, . . . , cn are the children of b, F(b) follows
from F(c1), . . . ,F(cn) by one of the rules of inference. We will refer to such a (fixed for each b) rule as the
justification of b. Note that the justification of a leaf (childless node) can only be (∧), as any other rule
requires at least one premise.
When the justification of a given node is the (△⊓) rule, the child with which the senior premise is
F -associated is said to be the senior child of the node, and the children with which junior premises are
associated are said to be junior children.
We may safely assume that, in the CL13-proof that we consider, the (M) rule never introduces into
the premise an elementary atom that is already introduced this way elsewhere in the proof, or that had
occurrences in the original formula F . Under this assumption, we agree to call each elementary atom p
that was introduced in T by an application of (M) (in the bottom-up view of this rule), as well as the
corresponding literals p and ¬p, pseudoelementary. The general atom P that was replaced by p in this
process will be said to be the origin of p. We also say that the above ¬p (resp. p) is the matching literal
of p (resp. ¬p).
As will be seen, intuitively, the formulas F -associated with the nodes of T are partial, compressed
representations of the games (“positions”) to which the original game F evolves at different stages of a play
according to the strategy that we are going to construct. To make both a description and an analysis of that
strategy easier, we need fuller representations of those games. For this purpose we use additional expressions
called hyperformulas. These are nothing but formulas with perhaps some osubformulas underlined (such
underlines can be iterated), and containing15 no nonlogical (general, elementary or pseudoelementary) atoms
other than those occurring in formulas F -associated with the nodes of T . In addition, each hyperformula
satisfies the following conditions:
• In every parallel osubformula E1 ∨ . . . ∨ En or E1 ∧ . . . ∧ En, no component Ei is underlined.
• In every toggling osubformula E1 ∨ . . . ∨En or E1 ∧ . . . ∧En, at most one component Ei is underlined.
If no component is underlined, such an osubformula is said to be virgin.
• In every choice osubformula E1⊔. . .⊔En or E1⊓. . .⊓En, at most one component Ei is underlined. If no
component is underlined, such an osubformula is said to be virgin. The non-underlined components
of a non-virgin choice osubformula, as well as all osubformulas of such components, are said to be
abandoned.
• In every sequential osubformula E1 ▽ . . . ▽En or E1 △ . . . △En, exactly one component Ei is un-
derlined. The occurrence of a component Ej which is to the left of such Ei (i.e., j<i), as well as all
osubformulas of Ej , are said to be abandoned.
As will be seen later, underlines in a hyperformula H carry certain information about the “current
position” of the game. Namely, an underlined component of a choice osubformula is one that has already been
selected by the corresponding player in a choice move associated with that osubformula, and an underlined
component of a non-abandoned sequential or toggling osubformula is its “currently active” component.
With each node b of T , in addition to the formula F(b), we also associate — let us say H-associate
— a hyperformula, which will be denoted by H(b). Such a hyperformula is always the original formula
F with some osubformulas underlined and some (pairs of positive and negative) occurrences of general
atoms replaced by pseudoelementary atoms. The association will be such that F(b) is always essentially a
“fragment” of H(b), obtained from the latter by deleting certain parts, and abbreviating certain other parts
through ⊤ and ⊥. Hence, to every occurrence of a subformula in F(b) corresponds — in an obvious sense
almost requiring no explanation but which will still be explained shortly for safety — an occurrence of a
subformula in H(b). As we are going to see, this correspondence will be such that the following conditions
are satisfied for each node b of the tree:
15Here “containing” refers to the whole formula rather than the underlined parts.
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Condition (i): To an occurrence of a subformula E1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ En in F(b) always corresponds an occurrence
of the form G1 ⊔ . . . ⊔Gn (no Gi is underlined) in H(b). Similarly for ⊓.
Condition (ii): To an occurrence of a subformula E1 ▽E2 ▽ . . . ▽En in F(b) always corresponds an oc-
currence of the form H1 ▽ . . . ▽Hm▽G1 ▽G2 ▽ . . . ▽Gn in H(b). Similarly for △ .
Condition (iii): To an occurrence of a subformula E1 ∨ . . . ∨En in F(b) always corresponds an occurrence
of the form G1 ∨ . . . ∨Gn (no Gi is underlined) in H(b). Similarly for ∧ .
Condition (iv): To an occurrence of a nonlogical (general, elementary or pseudoelementary) literal in F(b)
always corresponds an occurrence of the same literal in H(b). We extend the concept of pseudoelemen-
tary atoms or literals of formulas, and the “matching” relation between them, to the corresponding
atoms or literals of hyperformulas.
Here is a description of the association H, together with the meaning of the above-mentioned relation
“corresponds”. In each case, it is immediately obvious (by induction) that the above conditions (i)-(iv) are
satisfied.
1. With the root node of T we H-associate the hyperformula F˜ obtained from F by underlining the
leftmost component of each sequential osubformula (and nothing else). To each occurrence of each
subformula of F corresponds the same occurrence of the same subformula of F˜ (the latter may only
differ from the former in that it is in the scope of some underlines).
2. Suppose F(b) is obtained from F(c) by the (M) rule, namely, F(c) is the result of replacing in F(b) two
semisurface general politerals P and ¬P by some (pseudo)elementary politerals p and ¬p. Then H(c)
is the result of replacing in H(b) the corresponding two occurrences of P and ¬P (remember Condition
(iv)) by p and ¬p. To the occurrences p and ¬p in F(c) correspond the occurrences of the same p and
¬p in H(c); all other correspondences (also) remain the same as before — as in F(b) versus H(b), that
is.
Thus, the effect of the (M) rule on H(b) is the same as its effect on F(b).
3. Suppose F(b) is obtained from F(c) by the (⊔) rule, namely, F(c) is the result of replacing in F(b)
a semisurface osubformula E1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ En by Ei. Then H(c) is the result of underlining in H(b) the
ith component Gi of the corresponding osubformula G1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Gn (remember Condition (i)). To the
occurrence of Ei in F(c) corresponds the occurrence of Gi in H(c); all other correspondences (also)
remain the same as before.
Thus, while the effect of the (⊔) rule (seen bottom-up) on F(b) is replacing a ⊔-osubformula by one
of its components, the effect of the same rule on H(b) is simply underlining that (the corresponding)
component, without deleting anything.
4. Suppose F(b) is obtained from F(c) by the (▽) rule, namely, F(c) is the result of replacing in F(b) a
semisurface osubformula E1 ▽E2 ▽ . . . ▽En by E2 ▽ . . . ▽En. ThenH(c) is the result of replacing in
H(b) the corresponding osubformulaH1 ▽ . . . ▽Hm▽G1 ▽G2 ▽ . . . ▽Gn (remember Condition (ii))
by H1▽ . . . ▽Hm ▽G1 ▽G2 ▽ . . . ▽Gn. To the occurrence of E2 ▽ . . . ▽En in F(c) corresponds
the occurrence of H1 ▽ . . . ▽Hm ▽G1 ▽G2 ▽ . . . ▽Gn in H(c) unless n=2, in which case to the
occurrence of E2 in F(c) corresponds simply the occurrence of G2 in H(c); all other correspondences
remain the same as before.
Thus, while the effect of the (▽) rule (seen bottom-up) on F(b) is deleting the head of a ▽ -osubformula,
the effect of the same rule on H(b) is simply moving the underline one position to the right, otherwise
preserving all earlier — abandoned — components of the ▽ -osubformula.
5. Suppose F(b) is obtained from F(c0), F(c1), . . . ,F(ck) by the (△⊓) rule, where c0 is the senior child
of b and c1, . . . , ck (k ≥ 0) are the junior children. Then:
• H(c0) = H(b). If G′ is an osubformula of F(c0) that replaced an old osubformula G of F(b) when
transferring from F(b) to F(c0) = |F(b)| , then to G′ corresponds the same osubformula of H(c0)
as the osubformula of H(b) that corresponded to G; all other correspondences remain the same
as before.
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Remember that, on the other hand, F(c0) = |F(b)|. Thus, while F(c0) is obtained from F(b)
through “abbreviating” each general politeral and each ⊔-osubformula as ⊥, “abbreviating” each
⊓-osubformula as ⊤ and “abbreviating” each sequential osubformula as its head, H(c0) is just an
exact copy of H(b).
• Suppose F(cj) (1≤j≤k) is the result of replacing in F(b) a semisurface osubformula E1 ⊓ . . .⊓En
by Ei. Then H(cj) is the result of underlining in H(b) the ith component Gi of the corresponding
osubformula G1⊓. . .⊓Gn (remember Condition (i)). To the occurrence of Ei in F(cj) corresponds
the occurrence of Gi in H(cj); all other correspondences (also) remain the same as before.
Thus, while F(cj) is the result of replacing in F(b) a ⊓-osubformula by one of its components,
the transition from H(b) to H(cj) simply underlines that component.
• Suppose F(cj) (1≤j≤k) is the result of replacing in F(b) a semisurface osubformula E1 △E2 △
. . . △En by E2 △ . . . △En. Then H(cj) is the result of replacing in H(b) the corresponding os-
ubformula H1 △ . . . △Hm △G1 △G2 △ . . . △Gn by H1 △ . . . △Hm△G1 △G2 △ . . . △Gn (re-
member Condition (ii)). To the occurrence of E2 △ . . . △En in F(cj) corresponds the occurrence
of H1 △ . . . △Hm △G1 △G2 △ . . . △Gn in H(cj) unless n=2, in which case to the occurrence
of E2 in F(cj) corresponds the occurrence of G2 in H(cj); all other correspondences remain the
same as before.
Thus, while F(cj) is the result of deleting in F(b) the head of a △ -osubformula, a transition from
H(b) to H(cj) simply moves the underline in the corresponding △ -osubformula one position to
the right, without otherwise deleting the abandoned component(s).
6. Suppose F(b) is obtained from F(c) by the (∨) rule, namely, F(c) is the result of replacing in F(b)
a surface osubformula E1 ∨ . . . ∨En by Ei. Then H(c) is the result of underlining in H(b) the ith
component Gi of the corresponding osubformula G1 ∨ . . . ∨Gn (remember Condition (iii)). To the
occurrence of Ei in F(c) corresponds the occurrence of Gi in H(c); all other correspondences (also)
remain the same as before.
Thus, while the transition from F(b) to F(c) in the present case picks Ei and deletes all other com-
ponents of E1 ∨ . . . ∨En, the transition from H(b) to H(c) simply underlines the “picked” component
without deleting anything.
7. Suppose F(b) is obtained from F(c1), . . . ,F(ck) by the (∧) rule. Then:
• Suppose F(cj) (1≤j≤k) is the result of replacing in F(b) a surface osubformula E1 ∧ . . . ∧En
by Ei. Then H(cj) is the result of underlining in H(b) the ith component Gi of the correspond-
ing osubformula G1 ∧ . . . ∧Gn (remember Condition (iii)). To the occurrence of Ei in F(cj)
corresponds the occurrence of Gi in H(c); all other correspondences (also) remain the same as
before.
Thus, while F(cj) is the result of picking Ei and deleting all other components of E1 ∧ . . . ∧En
in F(b), the transition from H(b) to H(cj) simply underlines the “picked” component without
deleting anything.
The following lemma can be verified through a straightforward analysis of the above construction by
induction on the distance of a given node from the root:
Lemma 5.2 Let b be any node of T .
1. Suppose the justification of b is one of the rules (M), (⊔), (▽) or (△⊓). Then F(b) is the result of
replacing in H(b) every non-virgin choice osubformula by its underlined component, removing from
every sequential osubformula the abandoned components (the order of these changes does not matter),
and deleting all underlines.
2. Suppose the justification of b is one of the rules (∨) or (∧). Then F(b) is the result of replacing in
H(b) every general politeral by ⊥, every virgin ⊔-osubformula by ⊥, every virgin ⊓-osubformula by
⊤, every non-virgin choice osubformula, every sequential osubformula and every non-virgin toggling
osubformula by its underlined component, and deleting all underlines (again, the order of replacements
does not matter).
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As we remember, our goal is to construct a machine’s strategy that wins e[F ∗] for any interpretation
∗ and valuation e. Let us fix some arbitrary ∗ and e for the rest of this section. We prefer to define and
analyze our strategy in terms of hyperformulas rather than formulas. When H is a hyperformula, H∗ will be
simply understood as G∗, where G is the formula resulting from H by removing all underlines and replacing
each pseudoelementary atom by its origin.16 Hence, rephrasing our goal, it is constructing a machine’s
interpretation-independent strategy that wins F˜ ∗, where F˜ is the hyperformula H-associated with the root
of T . Such a strategy will be presented in the form of an EPM, which we call S.
The work of our machine S will rely on neither ∗ nor e, so we shall usually omit these parameters and
write a hyperformula E where, strictly speaking, the game E∗ or the constant game e[E∗] is meant. That is,
we identify hyperformulas or their subformulas with the corresponding games. Accordingly, any terminology
that we could use for games and their subgames we can as well use for hyperformulas and their subformulas,
and vice versa. This includes the usage of our “o” terminology: we may, for instance, say “the osubgame G
of G ∧H” to mean the subgame of the game/formula G ∧H represented by the osubformula G.
For simplicity and convenience, in our construction of S and our analysis of its work, we implicitly rely
on what in [16] is called the clean environment assumption — the assumption according to which the
adversary never makes illegal moves. Indeed, if the adversary makes an illegal move, S automatically wins
no matter what happens later, so such cases are not worth considering.
Definition 5.3 Let E be a hyperformula. We say that a run Γ is E-adequate iff the following conditions
are satisfied:
1. Γ is a legal run of E.
2. Whenever a given non-abandoned choice osubformula of E is virgin, no moves have been made in Γ
signifying a choice of a component in that osubformula.
3. Whenever a componentGi of a given choice osubformula of E is underlined, Γ contains a move signifying
a choice of Gi in that osubformula.
4. Whenever a given component of a non-abandoned sequential or toggling osubformula of E is underlined,
that component is the active component17 of the corresponding subgame of E in the run Γ.18
5. Γ does not contain any ⊤-labeled moves signifying moves within general oliterals of E.
6. Assume p and ¬p are non-abandoned pseudoelementary politerals of E, Θ+ is the sequence of labmoves
made (during playing Γ) within the p component of E, and Θ− is the sequence of labmoves made within
the ¬p component. Then Θ+ is a ⊤-delay of ¬Θ− (remember from [16] that, for a run Ω, ¬Ω means
the result of changing all labels to their opposites in Ω).
The above technical concept will play a central role in our soundness proof. The main intuition here is
that, when Γ is E-adequate, the hyperformula E accurately represents all relevant information about the
position resulting from playing Γ, so that E can be seen as an “adequate” description of that position; also,
⊤ has played “wisely” so far in a way that allows it to further maintain this “adequacy” and eventually
win. Namely, ignoring the abandoned components that are no longer relevant, we have the following. The
absence of an underline in a choice osubformula of E indicates that no choice of a component has been
made in the corresponding subgame (condition 2). On the other hand, if an underline is present in such
an osubformula, it shows which component has been chosen (condition 3). The underline in a sequential or
toggling osubformula indicates the active component of the corresponding subgame (condition 4). Also, the
subgames in the “matched” occurrences of atoms have evolved to — in a sense — the same games (condition
6), and ⊤ has not made any hasty moves in unmatched atoms (condition 5), so that, if and when at some
later point such an atom finds a match, ⊤ will still have a chance to “even out” the corresponding two
subgames.
16We can see that, this way, for any node b, the game (H(b))∗ is identical to F ∗.
17Remember from Definition 3.1 that the active component is the last-chosen component, or the default first component if
there were no choices at all; if infinitely many choices occured, then no component is considered active.
18More precisely, in the run Γ′ which is the subsequence of those labmoves of Γ — with certain prefixes deleted — that signify
labmoves within the sequential or toggling osubformula of E. For instance, if E is G ∨ (H △K) and the osubformula we are
talking about is H △K, then such a Γ′ is Γ2..
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During its work, our machine S maintains a record b which, intuitively, represents the node of T which
is currently being “visited” by S. Initially, b is the root of T . From any given current(ly visited) non-leaf
node b, S always moves (“jumps”) to one of its children c. This way, it always follows one of the branches
of the tree until it hits a leaf. Once it reaches a leaf, it will either stay there forever, or will backtrack by
jumping to one of the siblings of one of the predecessors of that leaf. Then it starts another upward journey
from that node towards a leaf, and so on.
Our description of the work of S, i.e. of the procedure WORK that it follows, as well as our further
analysis of it, will rely — more often implicitly than explicitly — on the earlier-listed Conditions (i)-(iv),
the description of the association H, Lemma 5.2 and the following lemma which, with Lemma 5.1 in mind,
can be verified by a straightforward analysis of the steps of WORK (left to the reader):
Lemma 5.4 At any time S jumps to a given node b of T (here the time of initializing b counts as the time
of “jumping” to the root), the then-current position Φ of the play is H(b)-adequate.
How S jumps from one node to another, and what moves (if any) it makes on each such transition,
depends on the justification of the node, and also — when the justification is (∧) — on whether the node
is a leaf or not. So, below we describe each possible case separately. In each case, b stands for the “current
node”, and Φ stands for the position reached “by now” in the overall play of the original game. This is
exactly how the procedure WORK followed by S goes:
Procedure WORK: S jumps to the root of T (i.e., initializes the record b to the root). Then it acts
depending on which of the conditions of the following seven cases is satisfied by b:
Case 0: The justification of b is the (M) rule. Let c be the child of b. So, H(c) is the result of replacing in
H(b) two general politerals P and ¬P by some pseudoelementary politerals p and ¬p. Then S looks
up in Φ all moves made by the adversary within the politeral P , and makes/copies those moves — in
the same order as they are made by the adversary — within the politeral ¬P . Similarly, it mimics,
in ¬P , all moves made by the adversary within P . After that, S jumps to c (that is, S updates the
content of the record b to c).
Case 1: The justification of b is the (⊔) rule. Let c be the child of b. So, H(b) has a virgin osubformula
G1⊔ . . .⊔Gn, and H(c) results from H(b) by underlining Gi for some 1≤i≤n. Then S makes the move
that signifies a choice of the ith component in the osubgame G1 ⊔ . . . ⊔Gn, and jumps to c.
Case 2: The justification of b is the (▽) rule. Let c be the child of b. So, H(b) has an osubformula
G1 ▽ . . . ▽Gi−1 ▽Gi ▽Gi+1 ▽ . . . ▽Gn, and H(c) results from H(b) by moving the underline from
Gi to Gi+1. Then S makes the move that signifies switching (from Gi) to Gi+1 in the corresponding
osubgame, and jumps to c.
Case 3: The justification of b is the (△⊓) rule. Then S simply jumps to the senior child of b.
Case 4: The justification of b is the (∨) rule. Let c be the child of b. So, H(b) has a virgin osubformula
G1 ∨ . . . ∨Gn, and H(c) results from H(b) by underlining one of the n components Gi. Then S makes
the move that signifies switching to Gi in G1 ∨ . . . ∨Gn, and jumps to c.
Case 5: The justification of b is the (∧) rule, and b is not a leaf. Let E1 ∧ . . . ∧En be the leftmost surface
∧ -osubformula of F(b), and let G1 ∧ . . . ∧Gn be the corresponding osubformula of H(b). Using Φ, S
looks up the currently (in the position Φ, that is) active component Gi of the osubgame G1 ∧ . . . ∧Gn.
Note that among the children of b is a node c such that H(c) is the result of underlining in H(b) the
ith component Gi of the osubformula G1 ∧ . . . ∧Gn. Then S jumps to that c.
Case 6: The justification of b is the (∧) rule, and b is a leaf. Let us say that a pseudoelementary politeral
of H(b) is widowed iff its matching politeral is abandoned. This is how S acts. It keeps granting
permission until the adversary makes a move. If such a move is a move within an abandoned component
of H(b), within a general oliteral or within a widowed pseudoelementary oliteral, S does not react and
continues granting permission. If the adversary makes a move within a non-abandoned and non-
widowed pseudoelementary politeral p or ¬p, then S makes the same move in the matching politeral
¬p or p, and continues granting permission. If no events other than the above kinds of events ever
happen, S will remain at b forever. However, a typical development during a visit of a leaf will be that,
sooner or later, one of the following three events takes place:
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Event 1: The environment makes a move that signifies a choice of Gi in some non-abandoned osub-
formula G1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Gn of H(b). Let d be the nearest predecessor of b whose justification is the
(△⊓) rule.19 It is not hard to see that, ignoring underlines in toggling osubformulas, H(b) and
H(d) are the same. Also, among the junior children of d is a node c such that H(c) results from
H(d) by underlining Gi in the osubformula G1 ⊓ . . . ⊓Gn. In this case, S jumps to that c.
Event 2: The environment makes a move that signifies a switch from a component Gi to the com-
ponent Gi+1 in some non-abandoned osubformula G1 △ . . . △Gi−1 △Gi △Gi+1 △ . . . △Gn of
H(b). Again, let d be the nearest predecessor of b whose justification is the (△⊓) rule.19 Ignoring
underlines in toggling osubformulas, H(b) and H(d) are the same. Also, among the junior children
of d is a node c such that H(c) results from H(d) by moving the underline from Gi to Gi+1 in the
osubformula G1 △ . . . △Gi−1 △Gi △Gi+1 △ . . . △Gn. In this case, S jumps to that c.
Event 3: The environment makes a move that signifies a switch to Hi in some non-abandoned,
non-virgin osubformula H1 ∧ . . . ∧Hn (one of the components is underlined) of H(b). Let d
be the nearest predecessor of b whose justification is the (∧) rule and where the osubformula
H1 ∧ . . . ∧Hn is (still) virgin.19 Let E11 ∧ . . . ∧E
1
m1
, . . . , Ek1 ∧ . . . ∧E
k
mk
be all of the surface
∧ -osubformulas of F(d) in the left to right order, and let G11 ∧ . . . ∧G
1
m1
, . . . , Gk1 ∧ . . . ∧G
k
mk
be the corresponding osubformulas of H(d). Then, obviously, H1 ∧ . . . ∧Hn is Gi1 ∧ . . . ∧G
i
mi
for one of 1≤i≤k. Let j= i+1 if i<k, and j=1 if i=k. Let Gjh be the currently active component
of Gj1 ∧ . . . ∧G
j
mj
(S finds this component from Φ). And let c be the child of d such that H(c) is
the result of underlining Gjh in H(d). Then S jumps to c.
Our remaining task now is to show that S wins F . Let us fix any run Γ that could have been generated
in the process of S playing the game against a clean environment. From now on, Γ and the play/scenario
in which it was generated will be the context of our discourse, so, for instance, when we say “S has made
move α”, this is to be understood as that S has made move α in the branch of computation that spells Γ.
We say that a given node b is established iff, in the context of our scenario, it satisfies the following
conditions:
• b has been visited a finite, nonzero number of times;
• any node visited after the last visit of b is a descendant of b in the tree.
Note that the set of established nodes is nonempty as (at least) the root is established. Indeed, all other
nodes are descendants of the root. And the root is visited exactly once: it cannot be re-visited after the
initial visit because backtracking always happens to a node that is a sibling of another, already visited, node,
but the root is not a sibling of anything. Note also that established nodes form a descendancy chain that
starts at the root and goes upward following one of the branches. That is because of any two established
nodes, one — the one that was visited last — is a descendant of the other.
Let then, throughout the rest of this section, ℓ be the established node that was visited last among all
established nodes. In other words, ℓ is the uppermost established node — the node at which the upward
chain of established nodes ends, so that ℓ is the unique established node that has no established descendants.
Call such a node the limit node of the play (of Γ, that is).
Lemma 5.5 The justification of the limit node ℓ is the (∧) rule.
Proof. Suppose, for a contradiction, that the justification of ℓ is (M), (⊔), (▽) or (∨). Then ℓ has a
single child c, which is always visited immediately after a visit of ℓ, and which can be visited only through
ascending from ℓ. Therefore, c is also visited a finite, nonzero number of times. Also, all non-c descendants
of ℓ are among the descendants of c, so any node visited after the last visit of c is a descendant of c. To
summarize, c is an established child of ℓ. But this is impossible because ℓ is the limit node of the play.
Now suppose the justification of ℓ is (△⊓). Let c be the senior child of ℓ. Consider the last visit of ℓ (as
an aside, such a visit would also be the first visit). It will be immediately followed by a visit of c. And c
cannot be re-visited after that, because the only way to get to c is to ascend to it from ℓ. So, c is visited
a finite, nonzero number of times. If all nodes visited after the visit of c are descendants of c, then c is an
19A little thought convinces us that such a d indeed exists.
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established child of ℓ, which is impossible because ℓ is the limit node. So, at some time after the last visit of
(ℓ and then) c, a backtracking jump occurs from a descendant leaf of c to a node d which is not a descendant
of c. With a moment’s thought, such a d can be seen to be a sibling of c, i.e., a junior child of ℓ. With
some more thought, one can see that, after that, the siblings of d will be no longer available for backtracking
jumps20 and, for this reason, any node ever visited after the jump to d will be a descendant of d. This makes
d an established child of ℓ which, again, is a contradiction.
From the above contradictions, we conclude that the justification of ℓ can only be (∧).
For the rest of this section, let E11 ∧ . . . ∧E
1
m1
, . . . , Ek1 ∧ . . . ∧E
k
mk
be all of the surface ∧ -osubformulas
of F(ℓ) in the left to right order, and let
G11 ∧ . . . ∧G
1
m1
, . . . , Gk1 ∧ . . . ∧G
k
mk
be the corresponding osubformulas of H(ℓ). Thus, ℓ has m1 + . . . +mk children (if ℓ is a leaf, then k=0),
which we correspondingly denote by
c11, . . . , c
1
m1
, . . . , ck1 , . . . , c
k
mk
.
We divide these children into k groups, according to their superscripts.
Lemma 5.6 The environment has lost in each osubformula Gi1 ∧ . . . ∧G
i
mi
(1≤i≤k) of H(ℓ).
Proof. We assume that k 6= 0 (ℓ is not a leaf, that is), for otherwise there is nothing to prove. Let us
try to understand what will be happening after the last visit of ℓ. This event will be immediately followed
by a visit of one of the children c1i (1≤i≤m1) of group #1. After that, for a while, all new (if any) nodes
visited by S will be among the descendants of c1i . This “while”, however, cannot last forever. Indeed, if
no other nodes are visited, then c1i would be an established child of ℓ, which is impossible due to ℓ’s being
the limit node. Thus, sooner or later, S will jump from a descendant leaf of c1i to a node d which is not a
descendant of c1i . With a little thought, we can see that such a d should be a node of the next (#2) group
of children of ℓ, that is, d=c2j for some 1≤j≤m2; also, the reason of this jump was that the environment
made a switch move within the G11 ∧ . . . ∧G
1
m1
osubformula of H(ℓ). Now we repeat the same analysis for
c2j and find that, again, sooner or later, the environment makes a switch move within the G
1
2 ∧ . . . ∧G
2
m2
osubformula of H(ℓ), which causes a jump to one of the nodes of group #3 of children of ℓ. And so on. Once
a node of the last group #k is reached, the next group will again be group #1, which starts a new, similar
to what we have already seen, cycle. This process will go on forever, so that, for each 1≤h≤k, a switch move
in the osubformula Gh1 ∧ . . . ∧G
h
mh
of H(ℓ) will be made by the environment infinitely many times. But we
know that making infinitely many switches in a toggling (sub)game causes the corresponding player — the
environment in the present case — to lose in that (sub)game.
Lemma 5.7 The run Γ is H(ℓ)-adequate.
Proof. According to Lemma 5.4, at the time of the last jump to ℓ, the corresponding initial segment
of Γ (the then-current position) was H(ℓ)-adequate. We need to verify that the H(ℓ)-adequacy of the run is
not lost afterwards. This can be done by examining each of the six conditions of Definition 5.3.
Condition 6 of Definition 5.3 obviously remains satisfied after the last visit of ℓ. This can be seen from
an analysis of the work of S during its visits of leaves.
For condition 1 of Definition 5.3, note that, if S makes infinitely many jumps, then the legality of Γ is
guaranteed by Lemma 5.4, because we have legal positions reached at arbitrarily late times. Otherwise, it
is not hard to see that ℓ is a leaf, which S never leaves after the last visit. During its visit of a leaf, S only
mimics the environment’s moves made in pseudoelementary literals. In view of the already verified condition
6 of Definition 5.3 and Lemma 5.1, together with some thought, one can see that such moves have to be legal,
20Hint: We may assume that the justification of d is not (M), (⊔) or (▽) (otherwise, instead of d, consider its nearest
descendant satisfying this condition). If F(d) is quasielementary, Events 1 and 2 of Case 6 of WORK will never occur after the
visit of d, so S will not be able to jump to a sibling of d. And if F(d) is not quasielementary, then d is (△⊓)-justified. Hence ℓ
is not the nearest (△⊓)-justified predecessor of any descendant leaf of d, and thus no backtracking jump is possible from such
a leaf to a child of ℓ, i.e. to a sibling of d.
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for otherwise it is the environment who first made an illegal move, which contradicts our clean environment
assumption.
For condition 2 of Definition 5.3, note that, while visiting (∨)- or (∧)-justified nodes (obviously only such
nodes are visited after the last visit of the (∧)-justified ℓ), S does not make any moves signifying a choice
of a component of a (virgin and non-abandoned) choice subformula. And, if such a move was made by the
environment (after the last visit of ℓ), it would cause S to make a backtracking jump to a node which is not
a descendant of ℓ, which is impossible because ℓ is established.
Condition 3 of Definition 5.3, by Lemma 5.4, was satisfied at the time of the last jump to ℓ. It trivially
remains so afterwards.
Condition 4 of Definition 5.3, again by Lemma 5.4, was satisfied at the time of the last jump to ℓ. It will
remain so if no moves are made afterwards by either player signifying switches in non-abandoned sequential
and non-virgin toggling osubformulas of H(ℓ). But indeed, such moves are not made. While visiting (∨)-
or (∧)-justified nodes, S does not make any moves signifying a switch in a (non-abandoned) sequential
osubformula. And, if such a move was made by the environment, it would cause S to make a backtracking
jump to a node which is not a descendant of ℓ, which is impossible because ℓ is established. Similarly, while
visiting (∨)- or (∧)-justified nodes, S does not make any moves signifying a switch in a non-virgin toggling
osubformula. And, if such a move was made by the environment, it would cause S to make a backtracking
jump to a node which is not a descendant of ℓ which, again, is impossible.
Finally, that condition 5 of Definition 5.3 also remains satisfied after the last visit of ℓ is evident.
Let H1 be the result of replacing in H(ℓ) each non-abandoned virgin ⊔-osubformula by ⊥. In view of the
H(ℓ)-adequacy of Γ (Lemma 5.7), virginity of such an osubformula means that no choices have been made
within the corresponding osubgame by the machine, so the machine has lost it. It is then obvious that Γ
remains H1-adequate, and Γ is a ⊤-won run of H(ℓ) iff it is a ⊤-won run of H1.
Let H2 be the result of further replacing in H1 each non-abandoned virgin ⊓-osubformula by ⊤. Then,
for reasons similar (or symmetric) to the ones in the previous case, Γ remains H2-adequate, and Γ is a ⊤-won
run of H1 iff it is a ⊤-won run of H2.
Let H3 be the result of further replacing in H2 each non-virgin choice osubformula by its underlined
component (without including the underline — it should be removed from under the component). And let
Γ3 be the result of deleting from Γ all moves signifying choices in such choice osubformulas. It is not hard
to see that Γ3 remains H3-adequate, and Γ2 is a ⊤-won run of H2 iff Γ3 is a ⊤-won run of H3.
Let H4 be the result of further replacing in H3 each sequential osubformula by its underlined component
(without including the underline). And let Γ4 be the result of removing from Γ3 all moves that signified a
switch in a sequential osubformula of H3, further removing all moves that signified moves within the non-
underlined components of such osubformulas, and then further removing from the remaining moves each
substring “i.” indicating that the move was made within (the underlined) component #i of a sequential
osubformula. For instance, if H3 = P ∨ (Q△R) and Γ3 = 〈⊤1.α,⊥2.1.β,⊤2.2,⊤2.2.γ〉, then H4 = P ∨ R
and Γ4 = 〈⊤1.α,⊤2.γ〉. It is not hard to see that Γ4 remains H4-adequate, and Γ3 is a ⊤-won run of H3 iff
Γ4 is a ⊤-won run of H4.
Let H5 be the result of further replacing in H4 each non-virgin toggling osubformula by its underlined
component (without including the underline). And let Γ5 be the result of removing from Γ4 all moves that
signified a switch in a non-virgin toggling osubformula of H4, further removing all moves that signified moves
within the non-underlined components of such osubformulas, and then further removing from the remaining
moves each substring “i.” indicating that the move was made within (the underlined) component #i of a
toggling osubformula. For instance, if H4 = P ∨
(
(Q ∨R) ∧S
)
and Γ4 = 〈⊤1.α,⊥2.1.1.β,⊤2.1.2,⊤2.1.2.γ〉,
then H5 = P ∨ R and Γ5 = 〈⊤1.α,⊤2.γ〉. It is not hard to see that Γ5 remains H5-adequate, and Γ4 is a
⊤-won run of H4 iff Γ5 is a ⊤-won run of H5.
Let H6 be the result of replacing in H5 all general politerals by ⊥. And let Γ6 be the result of removing
from Γ5 all moves signifying moves within those politerals. Γ6 clearly remainsH6-adequate. It is also obvious
that Γ5 is a ⊤-won run of H5 if (but not necessarily only if) Γ6 is a ⊤-won run of H6. This is so because we
may assume that ⊤ has lost in all general politerals, so that replacing them with ⊥ was legitimate; and if ⊤
did not really lose in some of those politerals, that is “even better” due to the monotonicity of the winning
conditions associated with all our game operations other than ¬.
Now, notice that, in view of clause 2 of Lemma 5.2, H6 coincides with F(ℓ). Also, as noted earlier,
the games F and H(ℓ) are the same (that is, F ∗ =
(
H(ℓ)
)∗
). Thus, summarizing our observations of the
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preceding six paragraphs, we have:
Lemma 5.8 Γ6 is F(ℓ)-adequate (with F(ℓ) here seen as a hyperformula rather than formula), and it is a
⊤-won run of F(ℓ) only if Γ is a ⊤-won run of F .
So, from now on, we can focus on F(ℓ) and its run Γ6. We continue seeing F(ℓ) — as well as H7
and H8 defined shortly — as hyperformulas rather than formulas, so that, when identifying them with the
corresponding games, their pseudoelementary atoms are interpreted as their origins are. We want to show
that Γ6 is a ⊤-won run of F(ℓ) — of the game (F(ℓ))∗, to be more precise.
Let H7 be the result of replacing in F(ℓ) (in H6, that is) all surface ∧ -osubformulas by ⊤. And let Γ7
be the result of removing from Γ6 all moves that signified moves within those ∧ -osubformulas. Obviously
Γ7 remains H7-adequate. Also, in view of Lemma 5.6, it is clear that Γ6 is a ⊤-won run of F(ℓ) iff Γ7 is a
⊤-won run of H7.
Let H8 be the result of replacing in H7 all surface ∨ -osubformulas by ⊥. And let Γ8 be the result
of removing from Γ7 all moves that signified moves within those ∨ -osubformulas. Γ8 clearly remains H8-
adequate. It is also obvious that Γ7 is a ⊤-won run of H7 if (but not necessarily only if) Γ8 is a ⊤-won run
of H8. This is so because we may assume that ⊤ has lost in all ∨ -osubformulas, so that replacing them
with ⊥ was legitimate; and if ⊤ did not really lose in some of those osubformulas, that is “even better” due
to the earlier pointed out monotonicity of the winning conditions associated with our game operations.
Now observe thatH8 coincides with ‖F(ℓ)‖. Summarizing the observations of the previous two paragraphs
and Lemma 5.8, we thus have:
Lemma 5.9 Γ8 is ‖F(ℓ)‖-adequate (with ‖F(ℓ)‖ here seen as a hyperformula rather than formula), and it
is a ⊤-won run of ‖F(ℓ)‖ only if Γ is a ⊤-won run of F .
In view of the above lemma, all that now remains to show is that Γ8 is a ⊤-won run of ‖F(ℓ)‖. For
this purpose, we may safely assume that, whenever p and ¬p are (matching) pseudoelementary politerals of
F(ℓ), the machine has won in exactly one of these two politerals. To see the legitimacy of this assumption,
remember condition 6 of Definition 5.3. The latter, together with the fact of the ‖F(ℓ)‖-adequacy of Γ8,
implies that the run Θ+ played in p is a ⊤-delay of ¬Θ−, where Θ− is the run played in ¬p. If we now
assume that the machine has lost in ¬p, meaning that Θ− is a ⊥-won run of ¬p, then, by the definition of
game negation, ¬Θ− is a ⊤-won run of p. But then, since Θ+ is a ⊤-delay of ¬Θ− and p is a static game, the
property of static games implies that Θ+ is also a ⊤-won run of p. To summarize, if the machine has lost in
¬p, then it has won in p. In other words, the machine has won in at least one of the osubgames p,¬p. If our
assumption about having won in exactly one of the two osubgames is false and both of these osubgames are
won, that is only better from the machine’s perspective, again due to the earlier mentioned monotonicity of
winning conditions.
Let us now consider the true/false assignment τ for the politerals of ‖F(ℓ)‖ that sends an (elementary or
pseudoelementary) politeral to true iff ⊤ has won the play within that politeral. In view of the assumption
of the preceding paragraph, obviously τ can also be seen as a truth assignment in the classical sense, i.e. as
a true/false assignment for the atoms (rather than politerals) of ‖F(ℓ)‖ which extends to all subformulas of
‖F(ℓ)‖ in the standard classical way. Since ‖F(ℓ)‖ is a tautology, it is true under τ . This, in turn, obviously
implies that Γ8 is a ⊤-won run of ‖F(ℓ)‖. Hence, by Lemma 5.9, Γ is a ⊤-won run of the original F .
6 Preliminaries for the completeness proof
6.1 Machines against machines
This subsection borrows a discussion from [5], providing certain background information necessary for our
completeness proof but missing in [16], the only external source on computability logic on which the present
paper was promised to rely.
For a run Γ and a computation branch B of an HPM or EPM, we say that B cospells Γ iff B spells ¬Γ
(Γ with all labels reversed) in the sense of Section 6 of [16]. Intuitively, when a machine C plays as ⊥ (rather
than ⊤), then the run that is generated by a given computation branch B of C is the run cospelled (rather
than spelled) by B, for the moves that C makes get the label ⊥, and the moves that its adversary makes get
the label ⊤.
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We say that an EPM C is fair iff, for every valuation e, every e-computation branch of C is fair in the
sense of Section 6 of [16].
Lemma 6.1 Assume E is a fair EPM, H is any HPM, and e is any valuation. There are a uniquely defined
e-computation branch BE of E and a uniquely defined e-computation branch BH of H— which we respectively
call the (E , e,H)-branch and the (H, e, E)-branch — such that the run spelled by BH, called the H vs.
E run on e, is the run cospelled by BE .
When H, E , e are as above, Γ is the H vs. E run on e and A is a game such that Γ is a ⊤-won (resp.
⊥-won) run of e[A], we say that H wins (resp. loses) A against E on e.
A strict proof of the above lemma can be found in [4] (Lemma 20.4), and we will not reproduce the
formal proof here. Instead, the following intuitive explanation should suffice:
Proof idea. Assume H, E , e are as in Lemma 6.1. The play that we are going to describe is the unique
play generated when the two machines play against each other, with H in the role of ⊤, E in the role of
⊥, and e spelled on the valuation tapes of both machines. We can visualize this play as follows. Most of
the time during the process H remains inactive (sleeping); it is woken up only when E enters a permission
state, on which event H makes a (one single) transition to its next computation step — that may or may
not result in making a move — and goes back into a sleep that will continue until E enters a permission
state again, and so on. From E ’s perspective, H acts as a patient adversary who makes one or zero move
only when granted permission, just as the EPM-model assumes. And from H’s perspective, which, like a
person in a coma, has no sense of time during its sleep and hence can think that the wake-up events that
it calls the beginning of a clock cycle happen at a constant rate, E acts as an adversary who can make any
finite number of moves during a clock cycle (i.e. while H was sleeping), just as the HPM-model assumes.
This scenario uniquely determines an e-computation branch BE of E that we call the (E , e,H)-branch, and
an e-computation branch BH of H that we call the (H, e, E)-branch. What we call the H vs. E run on e is
the run generated in this play. In particular — since we let H play in the role of ⊤ — this is the run spelled
by BH. E , who plays in the role of ⊥, sees the same run, only it sees the labels of the moves of that run in
negative colors. That is, BE cospells rather than spells that run. This is exactly what Lemma 6.1 asserts.
6.2 Logic CL14 and its dual
Our proof of the completeness part of Theorem 4.6 employs the conservative, elementary-base fragment
CL14 of CL13, obtained by restricting the language of the latter to elementary-base formulas — we refer
to formulas of this restricted language as CL14-formulas — and (correspondingly) deleting the (M) rule.
Logic CL1, historically the first system for computability logic proven (in [5]) to be sound and complete, is
a △, ▽, ∧, ∨ -free counterpart of CL14.
Of course, CL14 inherits soundness from CL13. In this section we are going to prove the completeness
of CL14.
Our completeness proof for CL14, in turn, employs the other logic CL14 which is a “dual” of CL14:
Definition 6.2 The language of CL14 is the same as that of CL14, and the rules of inference are:
(∨): ~H 7→ F , where F is an instable quasielementary formula, and ~H the smallest set of formulas satisfying
the following condition:
• Whenever F has a surface osubformula E1 ∨ . . . ∨En, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ~H contains the
result of replacing in F that osubformula by Ei.
(∧): H 7→ F , where F is a quasielementary formula, and H is the result of replacing in F a surface
osubformula E1 ∧ . . . ∧En by Ei for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
(▽⊔): |F |, ~H 7→ F , where F is a non-quasielementary formula, and ~H is the smallest set of formulas satisfying
the following two conditions:
• Whenever F has a semisurface osubformula E1 ⊔ . . .⊔En, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ~H contains the
result of replacing in F that osubformula by Ei.
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• Whenever F has a semisurface osubformula E1 ▽E2 ▽ . . . ▽En, ~H contains the result of replac-
ing in F that osubformula by E2 ▽ . . . ▽En.
The above formula |F | is said to be the senior premise of the rule or its conclusion, and the formulas
of ~H are the junior premises.
(⊓): H 7→ F , where H is the result of replacing in F a semisurface osubformula E1⊓ . . .⊓En by Ei for some
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
(△): H 7→ F , where H is the result of replacing in F a semisurface osubformula E1 △E2 △ . . . △En by
E2 △ . . . △En.
Lemma 6.3 CL14 6⊢ F iff CL14 ⊢ F (for any CL14-formula F ).
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on the complexity of F . It is sufficient to verify the ‘only if’
part, as the ‘if’ part (which we do not need anyway) can be handled in a fully symmetric way. So, assume
CL14 6⊢ F and let us see that then CL14 ⊢ F . There are the following cases to consider:
Case 1: F is quasielementary.
Subcase 1.1: F is stable. Then there must be a CL14-unprovable formula H satisfying the following
condition, for otherwise F would be CL14-derivable by the (∧) rule:
• H is the result of replacing in F a surface osubformula E1 ∧ . . . ∧En by Ei for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
But, if so, by the induction hypothesis, CL14 ⊢ H , whence, by (∧), CL14 ⊢ F .
Subcase 1.2: F is instable. Let ~H be the smallest set of formulas such that the following condition is
satisfied:
• Whenever F has a surface osubformula E1 ∨ . . . ∨En, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ~H contains the result of
replacing in F that osubformula by Ei.
None of the elements of ~H is provable in CL14, for otherwise F would also be derivable in CL14 by
(∨). Therefore, by the induction hypothesis, each element of ~H is CL14-provable. Hence, by (∨), we have
CL14 ⊢ F .
Case 2: F is not quasielementary.
Subcase 2.1: CL14 ⊢ |F |. Then there must be a CL14-unprovable formula H satisfying one of the
following two conditions, for otherwise F would be CL14-derivable by the (△⊓) rule:
• H is the result of replacing in F a semisurface osubformula E1⊓ . . .⊓En by Ei for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
• H is the result of replacing in F a semisurface osubformula E1 △E2 △ . . . △En by E2 △ . . . △En.
In either case, by the induction hypothesis, CL14 ⊢ H , whence, by (⊓) (if the first condition is satisfied) or
(△) (if the second condition is satisfied), CL14 ⊢ F .
Subcase 2.2: CL14 6⊢ |F |. Let ~H be the smallest set of formulas such that the following two conditions
are satisfied:
• Whenever F has a semisurface osubformula E1⊔ . . .⊔En, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ~H contains the result
of replacing in F that osubformula by Ei.
• Whenever F has a semisurface osubformula E1 ▽E2 ▽ . . . ▽En, ~H contains the result of replacing in
F that osubformula by E2 ▽ . . . ▽En.
None of the elements of ~H is provable in CL14, for otherwise F would also be derivable in CL14 by (⊔) or
(▽). Therefore, by the induction hypothesis, each element of ~H is CL14-provable. Since CL14 6⊢ |F |, by
the induction hypothesis, we also have CL14 ⊢ |F |. Hence, by (▽⊔), CL14 ⊢ F .
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6.3 The completeness of CL14
Lemma 6.4 If CL14 6⊢ F , then F is not valid (for any CL14-formula F ).
In fact, if CL14 6⊢ F , then F ∗ is not computable for some interpretation ∗ that interprets all atoms as
finitary predicates of complexity ∆3.
Idea. For the purposes of the present explanation, let us fix a variable x, agree to identify any valuation e
with the value assigned by it to x (as no other variables are going to be relevant), and call that value “input”.
Our proof of the above lemma rests on a technique which, for a CL14-unprovable and hence CL14-provable
formula F , constructs an EPM C and an interpretation ∗ such that every HPM H loses the game F ∗ against
C when H receives (on the valuation tape) itself — its own code, to be more precise — as an input.
Revisiting our soundness proof for CL13, the central idea in it was to design ⊤’s strategy — the EPM S
— following which guaranteed that the game would be eventually “brought down to” and “stabilize at” L∗
(in the sense that the rest of the play would essentially be just a play of L∗) for some (∧)-justified and hence
stable quasielementary formula L = F(ℓ). Such a strategy was directly extracted from a CL13-proof of F .
And it was shown that, as long as (or rather because) the elementarization ‖L‖∗ was true, S would be the
winner in the game. In a symmetric (yet simpler due to the absence of general atoms) way, a CL14-proof
of F allows us to extract ⊥’s strategy — the EPM C — that makes sure that, in every legal scenario, ⊤’s
play against C over F ∗ will be brought down to and stabilize at game L∗ for some (∨)-justified and hence
instable formula L — let us call such a formula L the limit formula of the play — such that C wins as long
as ‖L‖∗ is false. The instability of L means that, whatever the valuation/input e is, ‖L‖∗ is indeed false
at e for some ∗, so that C wins F ∗ on e for such ∗. However, the trouble is that ⊤’s different strategies —
as well as different inputs e of course — may yield different limit formulas L and hence require different,
perhaps conflicting, interpretations ∗ to falsify ‖L‖∗ at e. Since we are trying to show the non-validity
rather than non-uniform-validity of F , the whole trick now is to find a one common interpretation ∗ that,
for ⊤’s arbitrary strategy (HPM) H, would falsify ‖L‖∗ at some input e, where L is the limit formula that
H and that very input e yield. This is where a diagonalization-style idea comes in. We manage to define
an interpretation ∗ that makes the elementarization of every instable quasielementary formula G imply the
following: “When HPM H plays against C on input H, the limit formula is not G”. Now, if we let any
given HPM H play on input H against C, the elementarization of the limit formula L of the play — which,
under interpretation ∗, claims that L is not really the limit formula — is guaranteed to be false at H. This
eventually translates into H’s having lost the game F ∗ on input H.
Proof. Assume CL14 6⊢ F , which, by Lemma 6.3, means that CL14 ⊢ F . Fix a CL14-proof T of
F . From such a proof, we can extract an environment’s interpretation- and valuation-independent EPM-
counterstrategy C for F in a way symmetric to the way we extracted the machine’s EPM-strategy S from a
CL13-proof in Section 5. C is a counterstrategy in the sense that C plays in the role of ⊥ rather than ⊤.21
In fact, C is much simpler than S, because in the present case we only deal with elementary-base formulas.
Below we continue using the terminology and notation adopted in Section 5.
As in Section 5, we see the CL14-proof T as a tree, with each node b of which is associated a formula
F(b), such that F is associated with the root and, whenever c1, . . . , cn are the children of a node b, F(b)
follows from F(c1), . . . ,F(cn) by one of the rules of CL14, said to be the justification of b. Note that the
justification of a leaf can only be (∨), as any other rule of CL14 requires at least one premise.
As in Section 5, with each node b of T we additionally associate a hyperformula H(b). This association
goes like this:
1. With the root node of T we H-associate the hyperformula F˜ obtained from F by underlining the
leftmost component of each sequential osubformula.
2. Suppose F(b) is obtained from F(c) by the (⊓) rule, namely, F(c) is the result of replacing in F(b) a
semisurface osubformula E1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ En by Ei. Then H(c) is the result of underlining in H(b) the ith
component Gi of the corresponding osubformula G1 ⊓ . . . ⊓Gn.
3. Suppose F(b) is obtained from F(c) by the (△) rule, namely, F(c) is the result of replacing in F(b) a
semisurface osubformula E1 △E2 △ . . . △En by E2 △ . . . △En. ThenH(c) is the result of replacing in
H(b) the corresponding osubformula H1 △ . . . △Hm △G1 △G2 △ . . . △Gn by H1 △ . . . △Hm △G1
△G2 △ . . . △Gn.
21If we want to see C as a strategy in the ordinary sense, then it is a strategy for ¬F .
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4. Suppose F(b) is obtained from senior premise F(c0) and junior premises F(c1), . . . ,F(ck) by the (▽⊔)
rule. Then:
• H(c0) = H(b).
• Suppose F(cj) (1≤j≤k) is the result of replacing in F(b) a semisurface osubformula E1 ⊔ . . .⊔En
by Ei. Then H(cj) is the result of underlining in H(b) the ith component Gi of the corresponding
osubformula G1 ⊔ . . . ⊔Gn.
• Suppose F(cj) (1≤j≤k) is the result of replacing in F(b) a semisurface osubformula E1 ▽E2 ▽
. . . ▽En by E2 ▽ . . . ▽En. Then H(cj) is the result of replacing in H(b) the corresponding
osubformula H1 ▽ . . . ▽Hm ▽G1 ▽G2 ▽ . . . ▽Gn by H1 ▽ . . . ▽Hm▽G1 ▽G2 ▽ . . . ▽Gn.
5. Suppose F(b) is obtained from F(c) by the (∧) rule, namely, F(c) is the result of replacing in F(b)
a surface osubformula E1 ∧ . . . ∧En by Ei. Then H(c) is the result of underlining in H(b) the ith
component Gi of the corresponding osubformula G1 ∧ . . . ∧Gn.
6. Suppose F(b) is obtained from F(c1), . . . ,F(ck) by the (∨) rule. Then:
• Suppose F(cj) (1≤j≤k) is the result of replacing in F(b) a surface osubformula E1 ∨ . . . ∨En by
Ei. Then H(cj) is the result of underlining in H(b) the ith component Gi of the corresponding
osubformula G1 ∨ . . . ∨Gn.
Our goal is to construct an environment’s (counter)strategy C and an interpretation ∗ such that any HPM
in the role of ⊤ loses e[F ∗] against C for an appropriately selected valuation e. As in Section 5, we define
and analyze C in terms of hyperformulas rather than formulas. The work of C will rely on neither (the yet
to be defined) ∗ nor e, so, as before, we shall usually omit these parameters and identify hyperformulas with
the corresponding games. We shall also implicitly rely on the dual of the clean environment assumption,
according to which C’s adversary never makes illegal moves. And we also rely on certain observations —
perhaps in a symmetric, dual form — made in Section 5, such as Conditions (i)-(iv), Lemma 5.2 or Lemma
5.4.
During its work, just like S, our present EPM C maintains a record b, which represents the “currently
visited node” of the tree T . This is exactly how the procedure COUNTERWORK followed by C goes:
Procedure COUNTERWORK: C jumps to the root of T . Then it acts depending on which of the
conditions of the following six cases is satisfied by b:
Case 1: The justification of b is the (⊓) rule. Let c be the child of b. So, H(b) has a virgin osubformula
G1 ⊓ . . .⊓Gn, and H(c) results from H(b) by underlining Gi for some 1≤i≤n. Then C makes the move
that signifies a choice of the ith component Gi in the osubgame G1 ⊓ . . . ⊓Gn, and jumps to c.
Case 2: The justification of b is the (△) rule. Let c be the child of b. So, H(b) has an osubformula
G1 △ . . . △Gi−1 △Gi △Gi+1 △ . . . △Gn, and H(c) results from H(b) by moving the underline from
Gi to Gi+1. Then C makes the move that signifies switching (from Gi) to Gi+1 in the corresponding
osubgame, and jumps to c.
Case 3: The justification of b is the (▽⊔) rule. Then C simply jumps to the senior child of b — i.e., the
child with which the senior premise of F(b) is associated.
Case 4: The justification of b is the (∧) rule. Let c be the child of b. So, H(b) has a virgin osubformula
G1 ∧ . . . ∧Gn, and H(c) results from H(b) by underlining one of the n components Gi. Then C makes
the move that signifies switching to Gi in G1 ∧ . . . ∧Gn, and jumps to c.
Case 5: The justification of b is the (∨) rule, and b is not a leaf. Let E1 ∨ . . . ∨En be the leftmost surface
∨ -osubformula of F(b), and let G1 ∨ . . . ∨Gn be the corresponding osubformula of H(b). Let Gi be
the currently active component of the osubgame G1 ∨ . . . ∨Gn. Note that among the children of b is
a node c such that H(c) is the result of underlining in H(b) the ith component Gi of the osubformula
G1 ∨ . . . ∨Gn. Then C jumps to that c.
Case 6: The justification of b is the (∨) rule, and b is a leaf. C keeps granting permission until one of the
following three events takes place, and then acts accordingly:
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Event 1: The adversarymakes a move that signifies a choice ofGi in some non-abandoned osubformula
G1⊔ . . .⊔Gn of H(b). Let d be the nearest predecessor of b whose justification is the (▽⊔) rule. It
is not hard to see that, ignoring underlines in toggling osubformulas, H(b) and H(d) are the same.
Also, among the junior children — i.e., children F -associated with the junior premises — of d is
a node c such that H(c) results from H(d) by underlining Gi in the osubformula G1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Gn.
In this case, C jumps to that c.
Event 2: The adversary makes a move that signifies a switch from a component Gi to the com-
ponent Gi+1 in some non-abandoned osubformula G1 ▽ . . . ▽Gi−1 ▽Gi ▽Gi+1 ▽ . . . ▽Gn of
H(b). Again, let d be the nearest predecessor of b whose justification is the (▽⊔) rule. Ignoring
underlines in toggling osubformulas, H(b) and H(d) are the same. Also, among the junior children
of d is a node c such that H(c) results from H(d) by moving the underline from Gi to Gi+1 in the
osubformula G1 ▽ . . . ▽Gi−1 ▽Gi ▽Gi+1 ▽ . . . ▽Gn. In this case, C jumps to that c.
Event 3: The adversary makes a move that signifies a switch toHi in some non-abandoned, non-virgin
osubformula H1 ∨ . . . ∨Hn (one of the components is underlined) of H(b). Let d be the nearest
predecessor of b whose justification is the (∨) rule and where the osubformula H1 ∨ . . . ∨Hn is
(still) virgin. Let E11 ∨ . . . ∨E
1
m1
, . . . , Ek1 ∨ . . . ∨E
k
mk
be all of the surface ∨ -osubformulas of
F(d) in the left to right order, and let G11 ∨ . . . ∨G
1
m1
, . . . , Gk1 ∨ . . . ∨G
k
mk
be the corresponding
osubformulas of H(d). Then, obviously, H1 ∨ . . . ∨Hn is G
i
1 ∨ . . . ∨G
i
mi
for one of 1≤i≤k. Let
j= i+1 if i<k, and j=1 if i=k. Let Gjh be the currently active component of G
j
1 ∨ . . . ∨G
j
mj
. And
let c be the child of d such that H(c) is the result of underlining Gjh in H(d). Then C jumps to c.
It is obvious that C grants permission infinitely many times (even if the adversary makes illegal moves in
violation of our assumption), so that it is a fair EPM.
Note the symmetry between our present C and the machine S from Section 5, as well as between the
systems CL14 and CL13, and the corresponding proof trees. The only difference beyond this symmetry
is that, in the present case, we do not have to deal with general or pseudoelementary atoms, and the
associated (M) rule. This only makes things simpler. So, further we can reason in a way symmetric to (but
somewhat simpler than) the way we reasoned in Section 5, and establish that, in any play with environment’s
counterstrategy C, a node ℓ — the limit node of the play (defined exactly as before) — will be reached such
that:
• The justification of ℓ is the (∨) rule, and hence F(ℓ) is an instable quasielementary formula, so that
‖F(ℓ)‖ is a non-tautological elementary formula.
• The overall run generated in the play is H(ℓ)-adequate (“adequacy”, again, defined as before, albeit
Conditions 5 and 6 of Definition 5.3 are now vacuous and should be ignored).
Next, remember from Section 5 how we constructed the (hyper)formula H8 = ‖F(ℓ)‖ and the run Γ8
from H(ℓ) and an arbitrary run Γ — let us fix it throughout this paragraph — of the original game generated
in the scenario where S played in the role of ⊤. We can apply a similar (but simpler because some old steps
will be redundant due to the absence of general and pseudoelementary atoms) here and, after reasoning in
a way symmetric to the one that took us to Lemma 5.9, find that Lemma 5.9 holds in the present case in
the following, symmetric form:
Γ8 is ‖F(ℓ)‖-adequate, and it is a ⊥-won run of ‖F(ℓ)‖ only if Γ is a ⊥-won run of F . (8)
But the ‖F(ℓ)‖-adequacy of Γ8 in our present case means that Γ8 is simply the empty run 〈〉 — unlike the
situation in Section 5, where it could contain moves in (the now absent) pseudoelementary oliterals. Thus,
rephrasing (8), we have:
If 〈〉 is a ⊥-won run of ‖F(ℓ)‖, then Γ is a ⊥-won run of F . (9)
But ‖F(ℓ)‖ is an elementary formula with all of its atoms interpreted as elementary games. Hence it is
obvious that the empty run 〈〉 is a ⊥-won run of it if and only if ‖F(ℓ)‖ is simply false. Thus, (9) can be
further rephrased as follows:
If ‖F(ℓ)‖ is false, then Γ is a ⊥-won run of F . (10)
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What we have observed so far and what is relevant to our further argument, after restoring the so far
usually suppressed parameters ∗ and e, can be summarized as the following lemma:
Lemma 6.5 Let Γ be an arbitrary run that could have been generated when C plays in the role of ⊥. Then
there is a node ℓ of T , called the limit node of Γ, such that the following two conditions are satisfied:
1. The justification of ℓ is (∨).
2. For any interpretation ∗ and valuation e, if e[‖F(ℓ)‖∗] is false, then Γ is a ⊥-won run of e[F ∗].
Of course, different ⊤’s strategies (HPMs) N and different valuations e may yield different runs and
hence induce different limit nodes. So, our goal now is to select an interpretation ∗ such that, for any HPM
N , there is a valuation e at which ‖F(ℓ)‖∗ is false, where ℓ is the limit node of the play of N against C on
valuation e. In view of Lemma 6.5, this would mean that no HPM can win F ∗ against C.
Let us fix some standard way of describing HPMs, and let
N1, N2, N3, . . .
be the list of all HPMs arranged according to the lexicographic order of their descriptions, so that each
constant c can be considered the code of Nc. Next, we fix a variable x and agree that, for each constant c,
ec
is the valuation with ec(x)=c (and, say, ec(y)=1 for any other variable y 6= x). Further,
ℓc
will denote the limit node of the game over F between Nc, in the role of ⊤, and our C, in the role of ⊥, on
valuation ec. In more precise terms, ℓc is the limit formula of (induced by) the Nc vs. C run on ec (remember
Lemma 6.1).
Finally, let
d1, . . . , dk
be all nodes of T whose justification is the (∨) rule. For each such di, we fix a classical model (true/false
assignment for atoms) Mi such that
Mi makes the elementarization of F(di) false.
And, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we define the predicate Ki by
Ki is true at a valuation e iff ℓe(x) = di.
Now we define the interpretation ∗ by stipulating that, for each atom p,
p∗ = ∨{Ki | 1≤i≤k, p is true in Mi}.
(∨L means the ∨-disjunction of all elements of L, understood as ⊥ when the set L is empty.)
Consider an arbitrary c ∈ {1, 2, . . .}. In view of clause 1 of Lemma 6.5, we must have ℓc = dj for one of
the j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Fix this j. Observe that, at valuation ec, Kj is true and all other Ki (i 6= j, 1≤i≤k)
are false. With this fact in mind, it is easy to see that, for every atom p, p is true in Mj iff the predicate
p∗ is true at ec. This obviously extends from atoms to their ¬,∧,∨-combinations, so that ‖F(dj)‖ is true in
Mj iff the predicate ‖F(dj)‖
∗ is true at ec. And, by our choice of the models Mi, the formula ‖F(dj)‖, i.e.
‖F(ℓc)‖, is false in Mj . Consequently, ‖F(ℓc)‖
∗
is false at ec. But, according to clause 2 of Lemma 6.5, the
fact that ‖F(ℓc)‖
∗
is false at ec implies that Nc loses F ∗ against C on valuation ec.
Thus, no Nc computes F ∗, meaning that F ∗ is not computable, because every HPM is Nc for some c.
Note also that, as promised in the lemma, the predicate p∗ (for any atom p) is finitary as only the value
assigned to x matters.
To officially complete the present proof, it remains to show that
the complexity of p∗ is ∆3 (for any atom p). (11)
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Remember that an arithmetical predicate A(c) (with c here seen as a variable) is said to have complexity
Σ3 iff it can be written as ∃x∀y∃zB(c, x, y, z) for some decidable predicate B(c, x, y, z); and A(c) is of
complexity ∆3 iff both A(c) and ¬A(c) are of complexity Σ3.
We defined p∗ as a disjunction of some Ki, that we now think of as unary arithmetical predicates and
write as Ki(c). Disjunction is known to preserve ∆3 — as well as Σ3 — complexity, so, in order to verify (11),
it is sufficient to show that each Ki(c) (1≤i≤k) is of complexity ∆3. Further, we know that the limit node
should be one of dj with 1≤j≤k. Hence, ¬Ki(c) is equivalent to ∨{Kj(c) | 1≤j≤k, j 6= i}. Consequently, in
order to show that each Ki(c) is of complexity ∆3, it would suffice to show that each Ki(c) is of complexity
Σ3.
Let, for any node b of T , Jb(c, t) mean “in the play of Nc against C on valuation ec, at time t, C jumps to
node b”. Jb(c, t) is a decidable predicate. A decision procedure for it first constructs the machine Nc from
number c. Then it lets this machine play against C on valuation ec as described in the proof idea for Lemma
6.1. In particular, it traces, in parallel, how the configurations of the two machines evolve up to the tth
computation step of C, i.e. its tth configuration. Then the procedure looks at whether a jump to the node b
occured in that configuration, and correspondingly says “Yes” or “No”.
Looking at the meaning of Ki(c), this predicate asserts nothing but that di is the limit node of the play
of Nc against C on valuation ec. In other words, Ki(c) says that, in the play of Nc against C on valuation
ec, at some time x (∃x), C jumps to the node di and, for any y (∀y) greater than x, if C jumps to a node
b at time y, then b is a (proper) descendant of di, and there is a z (∃z) greater than y such that, at time
z, C jumps to some node which is not a descendant of b. Looking at this characterization and taking into
account the decidability of the predicate Jb(c, t) used in it (in the form “... jumps ...”), with some minimal
experience in dealing with arithmetical complexity, one can see that Ki(c) is indeed of complexity Σ3, as
desired.
7 The completeness of CL13
This section is devoted to proof of the completeness part of Theorem 4.6, according to which, whenever F is
a CL13-unprovable formula, F is not valid and, in particular, F ∗ is not computable for some interpretation ∗
that interprets all elementary atoms of F as finitary predicates of arithmetical complexity ∆3, and interprets
all general atoms of F as problems of the form (A11 ⊔ . . . ⊔ A
1
m) ⊓ . . . ⊓ (A
m
1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ A
m
m), where each A
j
i is a
finitary predicate of arithmetical complexity ∆3.
Outlining our proof idea, we are going to show that, if CL13 6⊢ F , then there is a CL14-formula ⌈F ⌉
of the same form as F that is not provable in CL14. Precisely, “the same form as F” here means that
⌈F ⌉ is the result of rewriting/expanding in F every general atom P as a certain elementary-base formula
Pˇ⊓⊔ . This, in view of the already known completeness of CL14, immediately yields non-validity for F . As it
turns out, the above formulas Pˇ⊓⊔ , that we call molecules, can be chosen to be as simple as sufficiently long
⊓-conjunctions of sufficiently long ⊔-disjunctions of arbitrary “neutral” (not occurring in F and pairwise
distinct) elementary atoms, with the “sufficient length” of those conjunctions/disjunctions being bounded
by the number of occurrences of general atoms in F .
Intuitively, the reason why CL14 6⊢ ⌈F ⌉, i.e. why ⊤ cannot win (the game represented by) ⌈F ⌉, is that
a smart environment may start choosing different conjuncts/disjuncts in different occurrences of Pˇ⊓⊔ . The
best that ⊤ can do in such a play is to match any given positive or negative occurrence of Pˇ⊓⊔ with one
(but not more!) negative or positive occurrence of the same subgame — match in the sense that ⊤ mimics
the environment’s moves in order to keep the subgames/subformulas at the two occurrences identical. Yet,
this is insufficient for ⊤ to achieve a guaranteed success. This is so because ⊤’s matching decisions for ⌈F ⌉
could be modeled by appropriate applications of the (M) rule in an attempted CL13-proof for F , and so
can be — through the remaining rules — either player’s decisions associated with choice, sequential and
toggling connectives in the non-molecule parts of ⌈F ⌉. A winning strategy (CL14-proof) for ⌈F ⌉ would then
translate into a CL13-proof for F , which, however, does not exist. What follows is an implementation of
the idea we have just outlined.
Fix a CL13-formula F . Let P be the set of all general atoms occurring in F . Let us fix m as the total
number of occurrences of such atoms in F ;22 if there are fewer than two such occurrences, then we take
22In fact, a much smaller m would be sufficient for our purposes. E.g., m can be chosen to be such that no given general
atom has more than m occurrences in F . But why try to economize?
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m=2.
For the rest of this section, let us agree that
a, b always range over {1, . . . ,m}.
For each P ∈ P and each a, b, let us fix an elementary atom
• Pˇ ab
not occurring in F . We assume that Pˇ ab 6= Qˇ
c
d as long as either P 6= Q or a 6= c or b 6= d. Note that the
Pˇ ab are elementary atoms despite our “tradition” according to which the capital letters P,Q, . . . stand for
general atoms.
Next, for each P ∈ P and each a, we define
• Pˇ a⊔ = Pˇ
a
1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Pˇ
a
m.
Finally, for each P ∈ P , we define
• Pˇ⊓⊔ = Pˇ
1
⊔ ⊓ . . . ⊓ Pˇ
m
⊔ , i.e. Pˇ
⊓
⊔ = (Pˇ
1
1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Pˇ
1
m) ⊓ . . . ⊓ (Pˇ
m
1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Pˇ
m
m ).
We refer to the above formulas Pˇ ab , Pˇ
a
⊔ and Pˇ
⊓
⊔ as molecules, in particular, P -based molecules. To
differentiate between the three sorts of molecules, we call the molecules of the type Pˇ ab small, call the
molecules of the type Pˇ a⊔ medium, and call the molecules of the type Pˇ
⊓
⊔ large. Thus, where k is the
cardinality of P , altogether there are k large molecules, k × m medium molecules and k × m × m small
molecules.
For simplicity, for the rest of this section we assume/pretend that the languages of CL13 and CL14
have no nonlogical atoms other than those occurring in F plus the atoms Pˇ ba (P ∈ P , a, b ∈ {1, . . . ,m}).
This way the scope of the term “formula” is correspondingly redefined.
An occurrence of a molecule M in a formula can be positive or negative. While a positive occurrence
literally means M , a negative occurrence looks like ¬M , which — unless M is a small molecule — should be
considered a standard abbreviation. For example, a negative occurrence of the medium molecule Pˇ a1 ⊔. . .⊔Pˇ
a
m
is nothing but an (“ordinary”, positive) occurrence of ¬Pˇ a1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ ¬Pˇ
a
m. One should be especially careful
when applying the terms “positive occurrence” and “negative occurrence” to small molecules, as here the
meaning of our terminology somewhat diverges from its earlier-used meaning for atoms. Specifically, a
positive occurrence of a small molecule Pˇ ab means — as expected — an occurrence that comes without ¬
in the formula. As for a negative occurrence of the molecule Pˇ ab (as opposed to the atom Pˇ
a
b ), it means an
occurrence of the subformula ¬Pˇ ab rather than just the Pˇ
a
b part of it under ¬. So, for example, the result
of replacing the negative occurrence of the molecule Pˇ ab by Q in the formula E ∨ ¬Pˇ
a
b is the formula E ∨Q
rather than E ∨ ¬Q, as ¬ was a part of what we call a “negative occurrence of Pˇ ab ”.
Let us say that a (positive or negative) occurrence of a molecule in a givenCL14-formula is independent
iff it is not a part of another (“larger”) molecule. For example, the negative occurrence of the medium
molecule Pˇ 11 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Pˇ
1
m in the following formula is independent while its positive occurrence is not:
(¬Pˇ 11 ⊓ . . . ⊓ ¬Pˇ
1
m) ∨
(
(Pˇ 11 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Pˇ
1
m) ⊓ . . . ⊓ (Pˇ
m
1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Pˇ
m
m )
)
.
Of course, semisurface occurrences of molecules are always independent, and so are any — semisurface or
non-semisurface — occurrences of large molecules.
Let E be a CL14-formula. By an isolated small molecule of E (or E-isolated small molecule, or a small
molecule isolated in E) we will mean a small molecule that has exactly one independent occurrence in E.
We will say that such a molecule is positive or negative depending on whether its independent occurrence
in E is positive or negative.
Next, the floorification of E, denoted
⌊E⌋,
is the result of replacing in E every positive (resp. negative) independent occurrence of every P -based (each
P ∈ P) large, medium and E-isolated small molecule23 by the general literal P (resp. ¬P ).
23Remember what was said earlier about the meaning of “negative occurrence” for small molecules.
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Lemma 7.1 Assume E is a quasielementary formula provable in CL14, and E′ is the result of replacing
in E some (positive or negative) isolated small molecules by ⊥. Then CL14 ⊢ E′.
Proof. Induction on the lengths of proofs. Assume the conditions of the lemma. The rules (△⊓), (⊔)
and (▽) can only derive non-quasielementary formulas. So, the last rule used in the proof of E should be
either (∨) or (∧). We correspondingly consider the following two cases.
CASE 1: E is derived by (∨) from a premise G. Obviously then E′ follows by the same rule (∨) from a
quasielementary formula G′ which is the result of replacing in G some isolated small molecules by ⊥. And,
by the induction hypothesis, CL14 ⊢ G′. Hence, CL14 ⊢ E′.
CASE 2: E is derived by (∧) from premises G1, . . . , Gn (possibly n=0). It is obvious that, as long as E′
is stable, it follows by the same rule (∧) from formulas G′1, . . . , G
′
n, where each G
′
i is the result of replacing
in Gi some isolated small molecules by ⊥. And, by the induction hypothesis, each G′i is provable. So, it
remains to show that E′ is stable, i.e., that ‖E′‖ is a tautology. Since E is derived by (∧), E is stable, i.e.,
‖E‖ is a tautology. But notice that the only difference between ‖E‖ and ‖E′‖ is that, wherever the former
has (occurrences of) isolated small — positive or negative — molecules, the latter has ⊥ instead. It is known
from classical logic that replacing isolated literals (literals that contain an atom that has a single occurrence
in the formula) by whatever formulas does not destroy tautologicity. So, ‖E′‖ is indeed a tautology.
Lemma 7.2 For any quasielementary formula E, if CL14 ⊢ E, then CL14 and hence CL13 proves |⌊E⌋|.
Proof. Assume E is a quasielementary formula. Observe that then |⌊E⌋| is nothing but the result
of replacing in E all isolated small molecules by ⊥. Therefore, by Lemma 7.1, if CL14 ⊢ E, we also have
CL14 ⊢ |⌊E⌋|.
We say that a CL14-formula E is good iff the following conditions are satisfied:
Condition (i): E contains at most m independent occurrences of molecules.
Condition (ii): Only large molecules (may) have independent non-semisurface occurrences in E.
Condition (iii): Each small molecule has at most one positive and at most one negative independent
occurrence in E.
Condition (iv): For each medium molecule Pˇ a⊔ , E has at most one positive independent occurrence of Pˇ
a
⊔ ,
and when E has such an occurrence, then for no b does E have a positive independent occurrence of
the small molecule Pˇ ab .
Lemma 7.3 For any good CL14-formula E, if CL14 ⊢ E, then CL13 ⊢ ⌊E⌋.
Proof. Assume E is a good CL14-formula, and CL14 ⊢ E. By induction on the length of the CL14-
proof of E, we want to show that CL13 ⊢ ⌊E⌋. We need to consider the following five cases, depending on
which of the rules of CL14 was used (last) to derive E.
CASES 1-2: E is derived by either (∧) or (∨). Then E is quasielementary and, by Lemma 7.2, CL13 ⊢
|⌊E⌋|. But since E is quasielementary, (E and hence) ⌊E⌋ does not contain any sequential or choice operators.
This means that ⌊E⌋ follows from |⌊E⌋| (no junior premises) by (△⊓). So, CL13 ⊢ ⌊E⌋.
CASE 3: E is derived by (△⊓). Let us fix the set ~H of junior premises of E. Each formula H ∈ ~H is
provable in CL14. Hence, by the induction hypothesis, we have:
For any H ∈ ~H, if H is good, then CL13 ⊢ ⌊H⌋. (12)
We consider the following three subcases. The first two subcases are not mutually exclusive, and either
one can be chosen when both of them apply. Specifically, Subcase 3.1 (resp. 3.2) is about when E has
a positive (resp. negative) semisurface occurrence of a large (resp. medium) molecule. Then, as we are
going to see, replacing that molecule by a “safe” ⊓-conjunct of it, corresponding to a smart environment’s
possible move, yields a good formula H from ~H such that ⌊E⌋ = ⌊H⌋. This, by (12), automatically means
the CL13-provability of ⌊E⌋. The remaining Subcase 3.3 is about when all semisurface occurrences of large
(resp. medium) molecules in E are negative (resp. positive). This will be shown to imply that ⌊E⌋ follows
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from its quasielementarization and the floorifications of some elements of ~H by (△⊓) for “the same reasons
as” E follows from its quasielementarization and ~H.
Subcase 3.1: E has a positive semisurface occurrence of a large molecule Pˇ⊓⊔ , i.e., an occurrence of
Pˇ 1⊔ ⊓ . . . ⊓ Pˇ
m
⊔ .
Pick any a ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that neither the medium molecule Pˇ a⊔ nor any small molecule Pˇ
a
b (whatever b)
have independent occurrences in E. Such an a exists, for otherwise we would have at least m+1 independent
occurrences of molecules in E (including the occurrence of Pˇ⊓⊔ ), which violates Condition (i) of the definition
of “goodness”. Let H be the result of replacing in E the above occurrence of Pˇ⊓⊔ by Pˇ
a
⊔ . Clearly H ∈ ~H .
Observe that when transferring from E to H , we just “downsize” Pˇ⊓⊔ and otherwise do not create any
additional independent occurrences of molecules, so Condition (i) continues to be satisfied for H . Neither do
we introduce any new non-semisurface occurrences of molecules or any new independent occurrences of small
molecules, so Conditions (ii) and (iii) also continue to hold for H . And our choice of a obviously guarantees
that so does Condition (iv). To summarize, H is good. Therefore, by (12), CL13 ⊢ ⌊H⌋. Finally, note
that, when floorifying a given formula, both Pˇ⊓⊔ and Pˇ
a
⊔ get replaced by the same atom P ; and, as the only
difference between E and H is that H has Pˇ a⊔ where E has Pˇ
⊓
⊔ , obviously ⌊H⌋ = ⌊E⌋. Thus, CL13 ⊢ ⌊E⌋.
Subcase 3.2: E has a negative semisurface occurrence of a medium molecule Pˇ a⊔ — that is, an occurrence
of
¬Pˇ 1a ⊓ . . . ⊓ ¬Pˇ
m
a .
Pick any b such that E does not have an independent occurrence of Pˇ ab . Again, in view of Condition (i),
such a b exists. Let H be the result of replacing in E the above occurrence of ¬Pˇ 1a ⊓ . . . ⊓ ¬Pˇ
m
a by ¬Pˇ
a
b .
Certainly H ∈ ~H . Conditions (i) and (ii) continue to hold for H for the same reasons as in Subcase 3.1.
In view of our choice of b, Condition (iii) is also inherited by H from E. And so is Condition (iv), because
H has the same positive occurrences of (the same) molecules as E does. Thus, H is good. Therefore, by
(12), CL13 ⊢ ⌊H⌋. It remains to show that ⌊H⌋ = ⌊E⌋. Note that when floorifying E, Pˇ a⊔ gets replaced by
P . But so does Pˇ ab when floorifying H because, by our choice of b, Pˇ
a
b is an isolated small molecule of H .
Since the only difference between H and E is that H has Pˇ ab where E has Pˇ
a
⊔ , it is then obvious that indeed
⌊H⌋ = ⌊E⌋.
Subcase 3.3: Neither of the above two conditions is satisfied. This means that in E all semisurface
occurrences of large molecules are negative, and all semisurface occurrences of medium molecules are positive.
Every such occurrence is an occurrence of a ⊔-formula which, as we remember, gets replaced by ⊥ when
transferring from E to |E|; but the same happens to the corresponding occurrences of ¬P or P in ⌊E⌋
when transferring from ⌊E⌋ to |⌊E⌋|. Based on this observation, with a little thought we can see that |⌊E⌋|
is “almost the same” as |E|; specifically, the only difference between these two formulas is that |⌊E⌋| has
⊥ where |E| has isolated small molecules (positive or negative). And this, in turn, obviously means that
|⌊E⌋| = |⌊|E|⌋|. As E is derived by (△⊓), we have CL14 ⊢ |E|. Hence, by Lemma 7.2, CL13 ⊢ |⌊|E|⌋| and,
since |⌊|E|⌋| = |⌊E⌋|, we have
CL13 ⊢ |⌊E⌋|. (13)
Now consider an arbitrary formula H ′ that is the result of replacing in ⌊E⌋ a semisurface occurrence of
a subformula G′1 ⊓ . . . ⊓G
′
n by G
′
i for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Our goal is to show that
CL13 ⊢ H ′ (arbitrary H ′ satisfying the above condition). (14)
The logical structure of E is the same as that of ⌊E⌋, with the only difference that, wherever ⌊E⌋ has general
literals, E has molecules. Hence E has an occurrence of a subformula G1⊓ . . .⊓Gn where ⌊E⌋ has the above
occurrence of G′1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ G
′
n. Let then H be the result of replacing G1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Gn by Gi in E. Of course
H ∈ ~H . So, in view of (12), it would suffice to show (in order to verify (14)) that H is good and H ′ = ⌊H⌋.
Let us first see that H is good. When transferring from E to H , Condition (i) is inherited by H for the
same or a similar reasons as in all of the previous cases. So is Condition (ii) because we are not creating any
new non-semisurface occurrences. Furthermore, notice that G1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Gn is not a molecule, for otherwise
in ⌊E⌋ we would have a general literal rather than G′1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ G
′
n. Hence, in view of Condition (ii), Gi is
not a small or medium molecule. This means that, when transferring from E to H , we are not creating new
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independent/semisurface occurrences of any small or medium molecules, so that Conditions (iii) and (iv)
are also inherited by H from E. To summarize, H is indeed good. Finally, it is also rather obvious that
H ′ = ⌊H⌋. The only case when we might have H ′ 6= ⌊H⌋ would be if there was a small molecule Pˇ ab isolated
in E but not in H , or vice versa (so that the independent occurrence of that molecule in E would become
P in ⌊E⌋ and hence in H ′ but stay Pˇ ab in ⌊H⌋, or vice versa). But, as we observed just a little while ago, E
and H do not differ in their independent/semisurface occurrences of small molecules.
Next, consider an arbitrary formula H ′′ that is the result of replacing in ⌊E⌋ a semisurface occurrence of
a subformula G′′1 △G
′′
2 △ . . . △G
′′
n by G
′′
2 △ . . . △G
′′
n. Our goal is to show that
CL13 ⊢ H ′′ (arbitrary H ′′ satisfying the above condition). (15)
This case is very similar to the case handled in the previous paragraph. The logical structure of E the same as
that of ⌊E⌋, so E has an occurrence of a subformulaG1 △G2 △ . . . △Gn where ⌊E⌋ has the above occurrence
of G′′1 △G
′′
2 △ . . . △G
′′
n. Let then H be the result of replacing G1 △G2 △ . . . △Gn by G2 △ . . . △Gn in
E. Of course H ∈ ~H. Continuing arguing as in the previous paragraph, we find that H is good and that
H ′′ = ⌊H⌋, which, by (12), implies the desired (15).
Based on (13), (14) and (15), we find that ⌊E⌋ is derivable in CL13 by (△⊓).
The remaining two CASES 4 and 5 are about when E is derived by (⊔) or (▽) from a premise H . Such
an H turns out to be good and hence (by the induction hypothesis) its floorification CL13-provable. And,
“almost always”, either ⌊E⌋ = ⌊H⌋, or ⌊E⌋ follows from ⌊H⌋ by (⊔) or (▽) for the same reasons as E follows
from H . An exception is the special case of (⊔) when H is the result of replacing in E a positive occurrence
of a medium molecule Pˇ a⊔ by one of its disjuncts Pˇ
a
b such that E has a negative independent occurrence
of Pˇ ab . Using our earlier terms, this is a step signifying ⊤’s (final) decision to “match” the two P -based
molecules. In this case, while ⌊E⌋ is neither the same as ⌊H⌋ nor does it follow from ⌊H⌋ by (⊔), it does
follow from ⌊H⌋ by (M). The secret is that the two P -based molecules are non-isolated small molecules in
H and hence remain elementary literals in ⌊H⌋, while they turn into general literals in ⌊E⌋.
CASE 4: E is derived by (⊔). That is, we have CL14 ⊢ H , where H is the result of replacing in E a
semisurface occurrence of a subformula G = G1 ⊔ . . .⊔Gn by Gi for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Fix these formulas
and this number i. Just as in CASE 3 (statement (12)), based on the induction hypothesis, we have:
If H is good, then CL13 ⊢ ⌊H⌋. (16)
We need to consider the following three subcases that cover all possibilities:
Subcase 4.1: G is not a molecule. Reasoning (almost) exactly as we did when justifying (14), we find
that H is good. Therefore, by (16), CL13 ⊢ ⌊H⌋. Now, a little thought can convince us that ⌊E⌋ follows
from ⌊H⌋ by (⊔), so that CL13 ⊢ ⌊E⌋.
Subcase 4.2: G is a negative large molecule ¬Pˇ 1⊔ ⊔ . . .⊔¬Pˇ
m
⊔ . So, Gi = ¬Pˇ
i
⊔. A (now already routine for
us) examination of Conditions (i)-(iv) reveals that each of these four conditions is inherited by H from E,
so that H is good. Therefore, by (16), CL13 ⊢ ⌊H⌋. Now, ⌊H⌋ can be easily seen to be the same as ⌊E⌋,
and thus CL13 ⊢ ⌊E⌋.
Subcase 4.3: G is a positive medium molecule Pˇ a1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Pˇ
a
m. So, Gi = Pˇ
a
i . There are two subsubcases
to consider:
Subsubcase 4.3.1: E contains no independent occurrence of Pˇ ai . One can easily verify that H is good and
that ⌊H⌋ = ⌊E⌋. By (16), we then get the desired CL13 ⊢ ⌊E⌋.
Subsubcase 4.3.2: E has an independent occurrence of Pˇ ai . Since E also has a positive independent
occurrence of Pˇ a⊔ , Condition (iv) implies that the above occurrence of Pˇ
a
i in E is negative. This, in conjunction
with Condition (iii), means that E does not have any other independent occurrences of Pˇ ai , and thus H has
exactly two — one negative and one positive — independent occurrences of Pˇ ai . This guarantees that
Condition (iii) is satisfied for H , because H and E only differ in that H has Pˇ ai where E has Pˇ
a
⊔ . Conditions
(i) and (ii) are straightforwardly inherited by H from E. Finally, Condition (iv) also transfers from E to
H because, even though H — unlike E — has a positive independent occurrence of Pˇ ai , it no longer has a
positive independent occurrence of Pˇ a⊔ (which, by the same Condition (iv) for E, was unique in E). Thus,
H is good and, by (16), CL13 ⊢ ⌊H⌋. Note that since H is good, by Condition (ii), both of the independent
occurrences of Pˇ ai in it are semisurface occurrences. The same, of course, is true for the corresponding
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occurrences of Pˇ ai and Pˇ
a
⊔ in E. Let us now compare ⌊E⌋ with ⌊H⌋. According to our earlier observation,
Pˇ ai only has one independent occurrence in E, i.e. Pˇ
a
i is E-isolated. Hence the independent occurrence of
Pˇ ai , just like that of Pˇ
a
⊔ , gets replaced by P when floorifying E. On the other hand, Pˇ
a
i is no longer isolated in
H , so the two independent occurrences of it stay as they are when floorifying H . Based on this observation,
we can easily see that the only difference between ⌊E⌋ and ⌊H⌋ is that ⌊E⌋ has the general atom P where
⌊H⌋ has the (two occurrences of) elementary atom Pˇ ai . Since ⌊E⌋ does not contain Pˇ
a
i (because the only
independent occurrence of it in E, as well as all large and medium P -based molecules, got replaced by P
when floorifying E), and since we are talking about two — one positive and one negative — semisurface
occurrences of P in ⌊E⌋, we find that ⌊E⌋ follows from ⌊H⌋ by (M). We already know that CL13 ⊢ ⌊H⌋.
Hence CL13 ⊢ ⌊E⌋.
CASE 5: E is derived by (▽). That is, we have CL14 ⊢ H , where H is the result of replacing in E a
semisurface occurrence of a subformula G1 ▽G2 ▽ . . . ▽Gk by G2 ▽ . . . ▽Gk. Just as in CASES 3 and 4,
based on the induction hypothesis, we have:
If H is good, then CL13 ⊢ ⌊H⌋. (17)
Reasoning as in the previous cases, we further find that H is good, and thus, by (17), CL13 ⊢ ⌊H⌋. Now, a
moment’s thought convinces us that ⌊E⌋ follows from ⌊H⌋ by (▽), so that CL13 ⊢ ⌊E⌋.
Now we are very close to finishing our completeness proof for CL13. Assume CL13 6⊢ F . Let ⌈F ⌉ be the
result of replacing in F all occurrences of each general atom P ∈ P by Pˇ⊓⊔ . Obviously ⌈F ⌉ is good. Clearly
we also have ⌊⌈F ⌉⌋ = F , so that CL13 6⊢ ⌊⌈F ⌉⌋. Therefore, by Lemma 7.3, CL14 6⊢ ⌈F ⌉. Hence, by Lemma
6.4, there is an interpretation † that interprets every elementary atom as a finitary predicate of arithmetical
complexity ∆3, such that
⌈F ⌉† is not computable. (18)
Let ∗ be an interpretation such that:
• ∗ agrees with † on all elementary atoms;
• ∗ interprets each general atom P ∈ P as (Pˇ⊓⊔ )
†.
Clearly ∗ interprets atoms as promised in Theorem 4.6. It is also obvious that F ∗ = ⌈F ⌉†. Therefore, by
(18), F ∗ is not computable. The completeness part of Theorem 4.6 is now proven.
A Proof of Theorem 3.2
Lemma A.1
1. Assume A1, . . . , An (n ≥ 2) are constant static games, Ω is a ℘-delay of Γ, and Ω is a ℘-illegal run
of A1 ∧ . . . ∧An. Then Γ is also a ℘-illegal run of A1 ∧ . . . ∧An.
2. Similarly for A1 △ . . . △An.
3. Similarly for A1 ∧A2 ∧A3 ∧ . . . and A1 △A2 △A3 △ . . ..
Proof. We will prove this lemma by induction on the length of the shortest illegal initial segment of Ω.
CLAUSE 1. Assume the conditions of clause 1 of the lemma. We want to show that Γ is a ℘-illegal run
of A1 ∧ . . . ∧An. Let 〈Ψ, ℘α〉 be the shortest (℘-) illegal initial segment of Ω. Let 〈Φ, ℘α〉 be the shortest
initial segment of Γ containing all ℘-labeled moves24 of 〈Ψ, ℘α〉. If Φ is a ℘-illegal position of A1 ∧ . . . ∧An,
then so is Γ and we are done. Therefore, for the rest of the proof, we assume that
Φ is not a ℘-illegal position of A1 ∧ . . . ∧An. (19)
Let Θ be the sequence of those ¬℘-labeled moves of Ψ that are not in Φ. Obviously
〈Ψ, ℘α〉 is a ℘-delay of 〈Φ, ℘α,Θ〉. (20)
24In this context, different occurrences of the same labmove count as different labmoves. So, a more accurate phrasing would
be “as many ℘-labeled moves as...” instead “all the ℘-labeled moves of ...”.
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We also claim that
Φ is a legal position of A1 ∧ . . . ∧An. (21)
Indeed, suppose this was not the case. Then, by (19), Φ should be ¬℘-illegal. This would make Γ a ¬℘-
illegal run of A1 ∧ . . . ∧An with Φ as an illegal initial segment which is shorter than 〈Ψ, ℘α〉. Then, by the
induction hypothesis, any run for which Γ is a ¬℘-delay, would be ¬℘-illegal. But, as observed in Lemma
4.6 of [4], the fact that Ω is a ℘-delay of Γ implies that Γ is a ¬℘-delay of Ω. So, Ω would be ¬℘-illegal,
which is a contradiction because, according to our assumption, Ω is ℘-illegal.
We are continuing our proof. There are three possible reasons to why 〈Ψ, ℘α〉 is an illegal (while Ψ being
legal) position of A1 ∧ . . . ∧An:
Reason 1: α does not have the form i or i.β for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then, in view of (21), 〈Φ, ℘α〉 is
a ℘-illegal position of A1 ∧ . . . ∧An. As 〈Φ, ℘α〉 happens to be an initial segment of Γ, the latter then is a
℘-illegal run of A1 ∧ . . . ∧An.
Reason 2: α = i for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, but ℘ = ⊤. With (21) in mind, 〈Φ, ℘α〉 can be seen to be a
℘-illegal position of A1 ∧ . . . ∧An. Hence, as 〈Φ, ℘α〉 is an initial segment of Γ, the latter is a ℘-illegal run
of A1 ∧ . . . ∧An.
Reason 3: α = i.β for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, but 〈Ψi., ℘β〉 is not a legal run of Ai. That is, 〈Ψ, ℘α〉i.
is a ℘-illegal position of Ai. (20) obviously implies that 〈Ψ, ℘α〉i. is a ℘-delay of 〈Φ, ℘α,Θ〉i.. Therefore,
since Ai is static, clause 1 of Lemma 5.1 yields that 〈Φ, ℘α,Θ〉i. is a ℘-illegal position of Ai. Notice that
〈Φ, ℘α,Θ〉i. = 〈Φi., ℘β,Θi.〉. A ℘-illegal position will remain ℘-illegal after removing a block of ¬℘-labeled
moves (in particular, Θi.) at the end of it. Hence, 〈Φi., ℘β〉 is a ℘-illegal position of Ai. In view of (21), this
implies that 〈Φ, ℘α = ℘.β〉 is not a legal position of A1 ∧ . . . ∧An, so that 〈Φ, ℘α〉 is a ℘-illegal position of
A1 ∧ . . . ∧An, and then so is Γ because 〈Φ, ℘α〉 is an initial segment of it.
CLAUSE 2. The reasoning here is the same as in the proof of clause 1, with the only difference that
one more possible reason should be considered to why 〈Ψ, ℘α〉 is an illegal (while Ψ being legal) position of
A1 △ . . . △An:
Reason 4: α = i for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and ℘ = ⊥, but either (1) Ψ does not contain switch moves and
i 6= 2, or (2) the last switch move of Φ is not i− 1. In either case, with (21) in mind, 〈Φ, ℘α〉 can be seen to
be a ℘-illegal position of A1 ∧ . . . ∧An. Hence, as 〈Φ, ℘α〉 is an initial segment of Γ, the latter is a ℘-illegal
run of A1 ∧ . . . ∧An.
CLAUSE 3. The reasoning here is virtually the same as in (the corresponding) clause 1 or clause 2, with
only “i ∈ {1, 2, . . .}” instead of i ∈ {1, . . . , n}”.
Since ∨ and ▽ are expressible in terms of ∧, △ and ¬ (with ¬ already known to preserve the static
property), in order to prove Theorem 3.2, considering only ∧ and △ is sufficient. For simplicity, here we
restrict ourselves to the n-ary case of ∧. Adapting our argument to the n-ary case of △, or the infinite cases
of ∧ and △, does not present any problem.
Assume A1, . . . , An are static constant games, Γ is a ℘-won run of A1 ∧ . . . ∧An, and Ω is a ℘-delay of
Γ. Our goal is to show that Ω is also a ℘-won run of A1 ∧ . . . ∧An.
If Ω is a ¬℘-illegal run of A1 ∧ . . . ∧An, then it is won by ℘ and we are done. So, assume that Ω is not
¬℘-illegal. According to the earlier mentioned Lemma 4.6 of [4], if Ω is a ℘-delay of Γ, then Γ is a ¬℘-delay
of Ω. So, by Lemma A.1, our Γ cannot be ¬℘-illegal, for otherwise so would be Ω. Γ also cannot be ℘-illegal,
because otherwise it would not be won by ℘. Consequently, Ω cannot be ℘-illegal either, for otherwise, by
Lemma A.1, Γ would be ℘-illegal. Thus, we have narrowed down our considerations to the case when both
Γ and Ω are legal runs of A1 ∧ . . . ∧An.
The fact that Γ is a legal, ℘-won run of A1 ∧ . . . ∧An implies that, where Ai is the active (last-chosen)
component of A1 ∧ . . . ∧An in Γ, Γi. is a ℘-won run of Ai. Taking into account that Ωi. is obviously a
℘-delay of Γi. and that Ai is static, the above, in turn, implies that Ω
i. is a ℘-won run of Ai, which, taking
into account that Ω is a legal run of A1 ∧ . . . ∧An and that the active component of the latter in Ω is
obviously the same Ai, means nothing but that Ω is a ℘-won run of A1 ∧ . . . ∧An.
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